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Introduction 
 
Agendas in ethics are often set by questions raised in the wider society. The growth and flourishing 
of environmental ethics is a good example of this phenomenon. In recent decades, the growing concern 
among scientists, politicians, economists, and the media regarding the future of life on the planet has 
raised all kinds of questions about the origin of the so-called ecological crisis. Complex analyses and 
different sets of solutions have followed. Yet the problems seem far from being solved. Ethicists and 
theologians have joined the conversation and have also proposed interpretations and complex, often 
contradictory, solutions to the problems raised by this crisis.
1
 
In this work, I neither analyze the historical roots of the current environmental crisis nor attempt to 
delimit the complexity and ramifications of the problems raised by the crisis. I merely seek to make a 
small contribution to the ongoing debate, rooted in the Catholic tradition. In writing this STL thesis I 
have tried to attain two different objectives. First, a more personal one, I have organized and clarified 
the many theological and ethical ideas I have studied in the last five years while reflecting on the 
particular ethical problem brought on by the ecological crisis. Second, I have tried to narrow down the 
focus of the growing field of Christian environmental ethics in order to make my contribution to the 
debate. 
In Chapter 1, I approach the concept of responsibility from both secular and religious perspectives, 
trying to understand the multiple dimensions of this complex concept and its proposed foundations. 
Even if this term rings of deontological and non-biblical tones, I believe responsibility expresses in 
contemporary terms central dimensions of Christian faith and ethics. The concept of responsibility is a 
                                                          
1
 For Robert J. Schreiter, theologies of ecology are one of the four “global theological flows” or unsystemic theological 
discourses currently shaping Christianity. Cf. Robert J. Schreiter, The New Catholicity: Theology Between the Global and the 
Local (N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1997), 15-21. 
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complex and multidimensional one. It arrived late in the history of moral theology and has acquired 
several meanings over the course of the last two centuries.
2
 The meaning of responsibility overlaps with 
many other philosophical and theological concepts. However, I will not explore all these connections 
and meanings in this work. The ones I will deal with primarily will be freedom, sin, justice, vocation, 
mission, love, or personal and social identity. In order to keep my focus sharp, in this introductory 
chapter I will rather narrow down my study to a group of secular, Protestant, and Catholic thinkers that 
has, directly or indirectly, tried to articulate an ethics of responsibility.  
In Chapter 2, I draw from sacramental theology and liturgy to offer a particular vision of human 
responsibility toward creation in a sacramental world where human vocation is one of service and care 
for future generations, the poor, and life on earth. I argue that responsibility is not just a term within the 
field of ethics, but a moral dimension flowing from sacramental experience and liturgical practice within 
a religious community. In Chapter 3, I frame this particular Christian vocation within the narrative 
formation of communal and personal identity. This is a type of narrative that takes into account both 
scientific and religious understandings of the natural world and human beings. In spite of the moral and 
narrative fragmentation of our time, I argue that a more humble story of human beings will not only 
provide a more accurate image of the human place in the cosmos but also foster an ethics of 
responsibility toward creation.  Finally, in Chapter 4, I turn toward Catholic Social Teaching and the 
concept of the common good as the aim and purpose of Christian responsibility toward creation. 
Sacrament, narrative (scripture), and ethics are the sources of a fully human, responsible, and Christian 
identity. 
                                                          
2
 Cf. Ibid., Chapter 2. 
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1. The dimensions of responsibility 
1.1. Secular voices: An appeal to save life on Earth and the imperative of responsibility 
 
For scientist Edward O. Wilson, “humanity is in a bottleneck of overpopulation and wasteful 
consumption.”3 The deep concern for the future of life, sense of urgency, and historical responsibility 
perceived in Wilson‟s writings is counterbalanced by his hope for an alliance for life of the two 
strongest cultural forces shaping human history, namely science and religion. According to Wilson, 
religion and science are “the two most powerful forces in the world today.”4 Both religion and science 
need to foster an alternative ethic of environmental sustainability and eco-justice in order to save life on 
earth. Wilson believes that this type of ethics is one of intergenerational responsibility; an ethics that 
takes fully into account the ecological services of nature and puts together an honest history where all, 
believers and non-believers, can agree. Moreover, for Wilson, stewardship is still a valid metaphor for 
humans in their project of being responsible and preserving life on earth. However, the meaning of 
stewardship needs to be well articulated and deepened. It requires a better understanding of the natural 
world, adequate scientific education, and a broader, less specialized academic knowledge. Education 
becomes one of the central places where responsibility toward the natural world is promoted. Yet, why 
should humans feel responsible for other, non-human forms of life? 
The “biophilia hypothesis” undergirds Wilson‟s ethical position. As Wilson puts it, “biophilia … is 
the innately emotional affiliation of human beings to other living organisms. Innate means hereditary 
and hence part of ultimate human nature.”5 For Wilson, evolutionary biology grounds human philia 
toward life in general. All species need to be valued since they are masterpieces of evolution and are 
genetically related to us. However, species cannot be saved unless we set aside large preserves of 
                                                          
3
 Edward O. Wilson, The creation: an appeal to save life on earth (New York: Norton, 2006), 92. 
4
 Ibid., 5. The necessary dialogue between science and religion in order to foster a unified narrative upon which build a robust 
theory of responsibility is a point I will address in Chapter 2. 
5
 Edward O. Wilson (ed.) The Biophilia hypothesis (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993), 31. 
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ecosystems and realize our common ancestry and interdependence. As I will argue in Chapter 3, a new, 
holistic, and more humble anthropology is required to move away from the current impasse and realize 
our shared responsibility toward the natural world. Human beings play a prominent role in the natural 
world. However, they are historically and genetically dependent on all other beings on earth. Put in 
economic terms, humans are heavily indebted to all other beings. Human nature was encoded during the 
time we lived in intimacy with the natural world, an intimacy that has been lost in most contemporary 
urban settings. This historical process has not only led to a rampant biological extinction and an 
increasing biological impoverishment of the earth, but has also led to, using Sally McFague‟s terms, the 
“extinction of experience” or “loss of biophilia.”6 
Jewish thinker Hans Jonas has expressed a similar sense of urgency and historical responsibility. 
Jonas has made an attempt to build a secular ethics of human responsibility in our current technological 
age. The urgency and deep concern for the future of life expressed by Wilson is paralleled in Jonas‟ 
ground-breaking work The Imperative of Responsibility. Jonas argues that modern technology has 
changed the very nature of human action, and hence previous ethical frameworks cannot cope with the 
present challenges posed by the technological age. Responsibility has come to the center of the ethical 
stage and has become the new rational guiding principle that can save humanity. Jonas proposes a 
“heuristic of fear” where the long-range effects and dangers of technology are brought to the present. As 
he argues, “we know much sooner what we do not want than what we want. Therefore, moral 
philosophy must consult our fears prior to our wishes to learn what we really cherish.”7  
Whether grounded on fear or not, Jonas stresses the responsibility to ensure a safe environment for 
future generations, a responsibility in which the cautionary principle will play a central role. “Under 
                                                          
6
 Cf. Sallie McFague, Super, natural Christians: how we should love nature (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997), 
Chapter 6. 
7
 Hans Jonas, The imperative of responsibility: in search of an ethics for the technological age (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984), 27. 
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such responsibility, caution, otherwise a peripheral matter of our discretion, becomes the core of moral 
action.”8 Statesmen and parents embody this important duty; parent-child relationship is the “archetype 
of all responsible action.”9 Intergenerational responsibility points toward some form of mutual 
indebtedness or, in Jonas‟ words, a “duty to be truly human.”10 
The centrality of intergenerational responsibility is also dramatically witnessed in political life. For 
German sociologist and historian Max Weber, one of the three decisive qualities for the politician is “a 
feeling of responsibility.”11 The (good) politician is interested in “the future and responsibility toward 
the future.”12 This type of future-oriented perspective in politics has been expressed by former General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev. In his Manifesto for the Earth, 
Gorbachev affirms that security, poverty, and environmental degradation are the three major challenges 
facing the world in the 21
st
 century. He also believes that humanity is facing a daunting historical task, 
“a humanity that already knows deep down that it must live in a united world and that it is responsible 
for future generations.”13 
Parents (Jonas), teachers (Wilson), and statesmen (Weber and Gorbachev) become the archetype of 
responsible action, the best metaphor of (inter)generational responsibility. They act in the place of other 
men and women. They show, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer pointed out, that “responsibility is fundamentally a 
matter of deputyship.”14  
But let us go back to Jonas for a moment before we move on to explore more explicitly religious 
perspectives on responsibility. It is worth noting that, paradoxically, although Jonas‟ secular reflection is 
                                                          
8
 Ibid., 38. 
9
 Ibid., 39. 
10
 Ibid., 42. 
11
 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” In James M. Gustafson and James T. Laney, On being responsible; issues in 
personal ethics (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 294. 
12
 Ibid., 298. 
13
 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, Manifesto for the Earth: action now for peace, global justice and a sustainable future 
(Forest Row, East Sussex: Clairview Books, 2006), 8. 
14
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 224. 
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an effort to foster a metaphysical ethics of responsibility grounded on a non-religious theory of value, he 
opens the door to explicitly religious insights. As he himself realizes, “it is moot whether, without 
restoring the category of the sacred, the category most thoroughly destroyed by the scientific 
enlightenment, we can have an ethics able to cope with the extreme powers which we possess today and 
constantly increase and are almost compelled to wield.”15 As William Schweiker contends, Jonas raises 
questions that can only be answered from a theological point of view. To these explicitly religious views 
on the idea of responsibility I turn now. 
 
1.2. Christian voices 
1.2.1. Dialogical theories of Christian responsibility 
 
Responsibility is a multidimensional concept. According to Bonhoeffer, six elements constitute the 
structure of responsible life: deputyship, correspondence with reality, pertinence, acceptance of guilt, 
conscience, and freedom. These six dimensions, however, have to be placed in a context, what he calls 
the locus of Christian vocation. Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of responsibility is a clearly Christocentric 
one. Responsibility is the answer of the believer to the call of Jesus Christ and a total response to reality; 
“the centre of my responsibility is determined by the call of Jesus Christ which is addressed to me.”16 
Responsibility is an all-embracing concept of Christian life which requires the whole person, “vocation 
is responsibility and responsibility is a total response of the whole man to the whole of reality.”17 The 
traditional terms used to express this “total response” is vocation or call. In short, Christian vocation is 
the context of Christian responsibility. However, this response is not a simple, conclusive answer. It is a 
                                                          
15
 Jonas, The imperative of responsibility: in search of an ethics for the technological age, 23. Toward the category of the 
sacred I will focus my attention in the following chapter. 
16
 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 257. 
17
 Ibid., 258. 
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call fraught with tensions and temptations that needs to be constantly renewed. Christian responsibility 
is ultimately conflictive, since it requires a total response to Christ in the midst of multiple, often 
contradictory calls. 
Bonhoeffer‟s Christocentric understanding of responsibility as response to a call puts his ethics into 
the orbit of dialogical theories of responsibility. Catholic authors like Charles Curran and Bernard 
Häring or Protestant ones like Karl Barth and H. Richard Niebuhr are also part of this particular ethical 
tradition. Dialogical theories, compared to social or agential theories, stress the importance of human 
encounters with the other, whether God or the human. 
Niebuhr, in his effort to move beyond deontological and teleological ethics, understands human 
actions as responses or answers. In The Responsible Self, he defines human actions as a response or 
answer. Building on this assumption, persons are not ultimately makers (teleology) or citizens 
(deontology), but “answerers.” According to Niebuhr, this dialogic understanding of ethics not only fits 
the biblical ethos better than the other two; it is also a more precise instrument for human self-
understanding. It helps us answer central questions: “to whom or for what am I responsible and in what 
community of interaction am I myself?”18 
These questions, though, cannot be completely answered since we are both free to respond and 
dependent on God and the natural world upon which we rely.  This somewhat contradictory situation 
points toward the intrinsic tension-filled and problematic character of Christian ethics. It also indicates 
the human reality theologians call sin. The human condition is one of internal division and conflict. It is 
                                                          
18
 H. Richard Niebuhr, The responsible self: an essay in Christian moral philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 68. 
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also a fallen and sinful one, an ultimately dependent condition, one in which being responsible is a 
never-finished task and a permanent open question.
19
 
At this point in my reflection, Niebuhr‟s theological reflection on responsibility has brought us back 
to one of the structural dimensions of responsibility pointed out by Bonhoeffer: the necessary acceptance 
of guilt and the recognition of sin. It also brings this reflection full circle back to the very foundation of 
Christian ethics, namely Christ. Jesus Christ is the one who “takes away the sins of the world,” (John 
1:29) the one who heals the broken human condition and shows the path to a restored, reconciled, and 
responsible life. Christian responsibility is a reflection on Christ, the model of universal responsibility.
 20
 
As Niebuhr affirms, “the responsible self we see in Christ … is a universally and eternally responsive I, 
answering in universal society and in time without end, in all actions upon it, to the action of the One 
who heals all our diseases, forgives all our iniquities, saves our lives from destruction, and crowns us 
with everlasting mercy.”21 
From the Christological dimension emerges a central aspect of Christian faith, namely love. Christ is 
the center of the moral life, a life shaped by forgiveness and the commandment of love. James Nash, in 
an effort to build a Christian environmental ethics grounded in love, has stressed that the distinctive 
character of Christian life is love. God is love (1 John 4:8), the whole of creation is a radical act of love, 
and all creatures are products of love (Cf. Wisdom 11:24). This theological claim holds radical 
implications for Christian ethics and places love at the heart of any ethical project. The Christian double 
commandment of love is an invitation to be responsible to God and to appreciate, respect, and be 
responsible for other humans. Love specially fuels one of the closest human relations, namely the 
parent-child relationship, one of the archetypes of responsibility. A “heuristic of love,” alongside a 
                                                          
19As Niebuhr states bluntly, “it is painful to think of the absolute dependence in which I have been established.”  Ibid., 115. 
20
 Cf. Ibid., 167. 
21
 Ibid., 145. 
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“heuristic of fear,” I believe, is a more appropriate way to foster Christian responsibility. The problem 
we face at this point in this discussion is that the object of love for Christians has traditionally been God 
and other humans. Can we speak of love and responsibility toward nonhuman beings?  
This question leads us to examine the necessary “expansion” of such a central dimension of Christian 
ethics as love. Nash does believe in the legitimacy of extending the double commandment of love to 
non-human beings; Christian environmental ethics points toward an “extension of love to the whole 
creation.”22 Love is the solid ground upon which to build Christian responsibility; love is the 
“metaethical source of Christian ethics.”23  
But Christian love faces many difficulties in an ecological setting. One of the most daunting ones is 
the problem of predation, violence, and competition in a morally ambiguous natural world where death, 
suffering, and killing are necessary. The concept of love also faces problems of definition when applied 
to nonhuman beings. What exactly does it mean to love nature? Is there a hierarchy of love? What about 
the relationship between agape and eros, between love and justice, or the exact role of love in the midst 
of tragic choices? These are just some of the challenges. However, in spite of the many tensions facing 
Christian love in an ecological setting, Nash firmly believes that environmental/biotic rights undergirded 
by justice and Christian love define human responsibilities toward the natural world. In other words, 
Christian love is, for Nash, a non-negotiable ingredient in a Christian ethics of environmental 
responsibility.
24
 
                                                          
22
 James A. Nash, Loving nature: ecological integrity and Christian responsibility (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1991), 
142. 
23
 Ibid., 140. According to Nash, reconciliation, communion, community, harmony, and shalom are the defining elements of 
love that will need to be translated into practical choices and policies. 
24
 For Nash the dimensions of Christian love in an ecological context are beneficence, other-esteem, receptivity, humility, 
understanding, communion, and justice. Cf. Ibid., Chapter 6. 
12 
 
Dialogical theories have shown that responsibility lies at the heart of the Christian vocation. Christian 
responsibility is an answer to the call of Christ. Moreover, it is not only a complex, tensional, loving 
answer to God, but to humans, nonhuman beings, and future generations as well. Furthermore, it is an 
answer fraught with difficult tensions and affected by the sinful human condition. Social theories of 
Christian responsibility help shed light on some of these challenges. 
1.2.2. Social theories of Christian responsibility 
 
Dialogical theories certainly hit the nail on the head and clarify many key dimensions of Christian 
responsibility. Yet, some other aspects, like the formation of moral identity and the role of the larger 
community in shaping personal responsibility, require further clarification. As Schweiker argues, “the 
self is an organ of the social whole; it is the community, not the individual, which is morally central.”25 
Social theories of responsibility come to our aid at this point, bringing the community to the fore and 
making a valuable contribution to this reflection. Persons are bodily beings in relation to other persons. 
We are shaped by our upbringing, the language we were taught, and the cultural tradition we grew up 
with. A person‟s values and roles are influenced by many different communities in our life: family, 
friends, nation, etc. As Schweiker defines it, a person is a “role-bearing individual whose identity has 
been shaped by assuming the values, obligations, and duties entailed in his or her role(s).”26 
Communities shape and invite people to play a particular role in social life. 
Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth Jonathan Sacks, in The Home We Build 
Together, has underlined the importance of community and responsibility in the task of building any 
viable society. Sacks argues that a responsible society prioritizes the ideas of giving and belonging 
instead of individual rights.  For him, the “politics of responsibility” can find a solid ground on the 
                                                          
25
 Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian ethics, 93. 
26
 Ibid., 163. 
13 
 
ancient biblical idea of covenant; a responsible, covenantal society “is a moral community, future-
oriented, goal-directed, whose citizens are on a journey toward a destination.”27 For Sacks, rights and 
responsibilities belong to two different systems. The Bible, he argues, has no word for “rights;” “it sets 
forth its moral vision entirely in terms of duties, obligations, responsibilities and commands.”28 The 
covenant is a form of “transfer of responsibility” to human beings. Rights undergird democratic societies 
and are implicitly stated in the monotheistic traditions. Their importance should not be downplayed. 
However, as Sacks contends, “the Bible is more concerned with cultivating habits of responsibility.”29 
At this point, I could keep on emphasizing the importance of community in the identity formation 
process of the person and the construction of a viable society, isolating community forces like esteem 
and shame as the main elements shaping moral responsibility, downplaying dimensions like autonomy 
and individual freedom. Conversely, I could stress the importance of freedom and autonomy against 
cultural and social traditions in order to foster a truly adult, emancipated, responsible society. However, 
both dimensions are pointing at something important and worth consideration, namely the circular 
relationship between community and personal responsibility. 
This circularity, again, shows the conflictive character of moral life and the tensional relationship 
between person and community in the moral identity formation process. It also evidences how ethical 
theories are heavily influenced by particular anthropological options. As Schweiker points out, “the idea 
                                                          
27
 Jonathan Sacks, The home we build together: recreating society (London ; New York: Continuum, 2007), 125. The goal of 
such a community is the common good or, as I will suggest in Chapter 4, the preservation of the common good of the single 
earth system. 
28
 Ibid., 132. 
29
 133. Hans Kung, in his search of a new global ethic, has stressed the importance of a Universal Declaration of Human 
Responsibilities that would complement the previous Declaration of Human Rights. Although rights and responsibilities can 
be distinguished, they cannot be separated from each other. As Kung argues, “human rights and human responsibilities do not 
mutually restrict each other for society but supplement each other in a fruitful way.” Hans Kung, “Don‟t Be Afraid of Ethics! 
Why we need to talk of responsibilities as well as rights.” In World's Parliament of Religions, A global ethic and global 
responsibilities: two declarations, InterAction Council ed. (London: SCM, 1998), 118. Kung also argues that ethics goes well 
beyond the sphere of law and thus there is a fundamental distinction between law and ethics. An ethics of responsibility can 
provide the necessary motivation to respect and foster human rights; “an ethical impulse and the motivation of norms is 
needed for an effective realization of human rights” (Ibid. 111). 
14 
 
of responsibility is embedded in the modern debate about how to understand human existence.”30 In 
other words, depending on how human beings in community are understood, particular ethical elements 
will be stressed, and a particular theory of responsibility will emerge. Inevitable intellectual options 
remind us that, in spite of philosophical and theological preferences, different views have to be taken 
into consideration. 
Social theories of responsibility insist that Christian character and identity are shaped through both 
narrative and community. Yet narrative and community are not two different elements, but rather 
dialogical dimensions of a single, ongoing formation process. If we consider community to be the 
starting point of any moral account of responsibility, then, as Stanley Hauerwas suggests - and Sacks 
would subscribe to this as well - the crucial social practice of a religious community would be “telling 
the story” of God‟s action in the world. Works of mercy and education, for instance, would be practical 
ways of telling the same story. The aim of moral Christian life is not to grasp ethical concepts, rules or 
laws, but to appropriate and live out the biblical story. A particular ethos will flow out from this living 
story, or, more specifically, as I will argue in the next chapter, an ethos of responsibility will be shaped 
by the Christian story rehearsed and continually reenacted in the Eucharist.  
Social theorists of responsibility also stress the importance of language, storytelling, and tradition to 
hold communities together and build a persisting moral identity through time.
31
 For Hauerwas, one of 
the leading thinkers of this school of thought, community and scripture are correlative realities that 
shape each other.
32
 Language, knowledge, and roles are learnt in community. One cannot be morally 
responsible unless he/she has certain knowledge of the context and consequences of his/her actions. 
Community and socially-constructed linguistic categories provide the necessary framework to interpret 
                                                          
30
 Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian ethics, 65. 
31
 Ibid., Chapter 7. 
32
 Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, A community of character: toward a constructive Christian social ethic (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).  
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moral actions and express moral ideas. Visions of life, ethical insights, and cultural narratives only take 
place in historical and communal contexts. They are sustained in communities that provide the symbols, 
rites, and hermeneutical resources to make them intelligible. 
However, social factors do not tell the whole story. As dialogical theories emphasize, even in a 
strongly socially-shaped environment, a free, responsible answer is required in order to have adult, fully-
developed persons. To be responsible is, to an important extent, to be free and able to interpret what is 
happening and what the outcome of a particular action is. In other words, responsibility requires 
socially-constructed knowledge and a certain degree of personal freedom. To these two dimensions I 
now turn. 
1.2.3. Responsibility, freedom, and sin 
 
“The basic premise should be to aim at the greatest amount of freedom possible, but also to 
develop the fullest sense of responsibility that will allow that freedom itself to grow.”33 
In spite of the strong influence of community and the power of collective sin on the person, the quest 
for responsibility has to deal at some point with human agency and freedom. There is a commonly held 
belief in jurisprudence, psychology, ethics, and theology that, unless humans are free and act 
voluntarily, it would make no sense to talk about responsibility. Agential theories of responsibility have 
stressed the importance of individual freedom in order to be morally accountable; a responsible society 
is one composed of free agents. This dimension is present, though to a lesser extent, in dialogic and 
social theories as well. Freedom appears as a necessary element in any moral reflection and, 
furthermore, as Schweiker contends, “the way freedom is understood shapes an account of 
responsibility.”34  
                                                          
33
 World's Parliament, A global ethic and global responsibilities: two declarations, 4. 
34
 Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian ethics, 148. 
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Let us turn now briefly to Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest medieval theologians, to frame the 
importance of freedom in moral life. Aquinas‟ interest on theological determinism and human freedom 
makes him argue in the Summa Theologiae that “perfect” human knowledge makes voluntary action 
possible ().
35
 For Aquinas, “perfect knowledge of the end” consists not only in “apprehending the thing 
which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that 
end” (Cf. ST I-II, q6.a2). Informed, “perfect” knowledge and freedom go necessarily together; you 
cannot have one without the other. This is why violence, fear, and ignorance deprive one of perfect 
knowledge and hence cause involuntariness (Cf. ST I-II, q6.a.5.6.8). Perfect knowledge, grounded in the 
theological understanding of the human as a rationally created being or imago Dei, differentiates rational 
(human) and irrational beings (nonhuman) and makes moral responsibility possible. In short, from 
Aquinas we learn that both informed knowledge and freedom are necessary elements in the quest for an 
ethics of Christian responsibility. 
Building on Aquinas and Martin Heidegger, Karl Rahner contends that both freedom and 
responsibility are “existentials of human existence.”36 Rahner‟s theological understanding of freedom is 
related to, yet has to be distinguished from, the understanding of freedom within the fields of 
psychology and jurisprudence. Freedom flows from the open and undetermined nature of human beings; 
freedom is “the capacity of the one subject to decide about himself in his single totality.”37 Furthermore, 
freedom is the condition of possibility of a responsible life and, conversely, for Rahner, responsibility is 
already present in the experience of transcendental freedom.  
                                                          
35
 Cf. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica  I-II, q6.a1 In http://www.newadvent.org/summa. Accessed March 2011. 
36
 Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian faith: an introduction to the idea of Christianity (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 
93. 
37
 Ibid., 94. 
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In this experience “‟I‟ always experience myself as the subject who is given over to himself.”38 A 
person can evade his responsibility “and can interpret himself as the product of what is not himself.”39 
This is the root of sin, “the possibility of a decision against God.” Paradoxically, in being disobedient 
the subject is both acting as a free subject and being co-determined by others. Person and community 
are, once again, in a tensional relationship. Sin, freedom, and hence responsibility are socially 
dependent. Sin is not only a personal human dimension, but a collective one as well. As Rahner puts it, 
human sinful condition is co-determined “by the guilt of others.”40 When it comes to responsibility, 
Rahner tries to balance a sound understanding of personal freedom with the pervasive and community-
driven presence of sin. Both elements are held in tension and offer a context for understanding the 
paradoxical character of Christian responsibility. 
1.2.4. Responsibility and knowledge 
 
Freedom and knowledge are necessary ingredients in any theory of responsibility. For Aquinas, 
“perfect” knowledge made voluntary actions possible and, as Wilson has pointed out, in spite of the 
intrinsic uncertainty of any scientific statement, scientifically-informed knowledge is necessary in order 
to foster responsibility for the future of life on earth. Knowledge is, to a great extent, as I have already 
underlined, socially-constructed and linguistically mediated. Along these lines, leading environmental 
ethicists have stressed the importance of informed knowledge or “ecological literacy” in order to foster 
responsibility toward nature. Environmental ethicists such as Sally McFague, John Hart, and Michael 
Northcott have insisted on the importance of knowledge and direct experience of the natural world in 
order to foster an environmental ethics of responsible care for creation. 
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According to McFague, the modern atomistic anthropology, disembodied epistemology, and the 
urban “extinction of experience” are some of the key factors that have led to the present environmental 
crisis. For her, a new inter-subjective, embodied, ecologically literate model of knowledge will foster the 
emergence of an ethics of responsible care for nature. Direct exposure to nature is required in order to 
form this type of “ecologically proficient” subject.41 For Hart, whose environmental ethics is inspired in 
the narrative, biographical accounts of Christian saints like St. Francis of Assisi and the community-
based insights of Native American Indians, a “relational consciousness,” deeply connected to a 
“relational community,” will foster responsibility and commitment for the commons.42 The importance 
of these traditional insights should not be overlooked, but rather connected to postmodern scientific 
understandings of nature. Northcott opts for a relational anthropology inspired by the natural law 
tradition. He believes that local communities need to recover the mechanisms of environmental control. 
Most environmental problems have a local character and require local solutions. Stable local 
communities often have the moral capital and the ecological knowledge to tackle these problems. 
Informed and ecologically sound knowledge is local and communal; it has to be placed, as he puts it, in 
a “parochial” setting. This type of local, environmentally-literate community sets the context of 
responsibility toward nature.
43
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For these three authors, community, narrative, ecological literacy (knowledge), and responsibility are 
deeply intertwined. In all three cases, an inter-subjective, relational, non-individualistic anthropology 
underlies their understanding of Christian responsibility toward nature. 
1.2.5. Responsibility and Christian identity 
 
In this introductory chapter, I have collected a variety of elements that can frame a Christian 
understanding of environmental responsibility and, hopefully, gained a better understanding of where I 
stand. I also hope that these elements do not look like isolated brushstrokes in an abstract expressionist 
painting. It is true that we live, as Alasdair MacIntyre has pointed out, in a world of fragmented, often 
contesting, moral narratives.
44
 Yet, as I will try to show in Chapter 3, I believe we still can make “moral 
sense” and find a coherent story open to other traditions, secular and religious alike. I am aware of the 
daunting challenge posed by the modern fragmentation of life and the increasing specialization of 
knowledge. This is why I cannot bring these different moral dimensions together into a single, unified 
theory of Christian responsibility. Yet I hope this introductory chapter has set an appropriate background 
upon which some constructive contributions to a Catholic understanding of responsibility toward nature 
can be made. 
Christ and vocation, fear and love, sin and guilt, knowledge and freedom, narrative and community 
are some of the central moral elements of Christian responsibility I have isolated so far. All these 
elements are somehow connected and, when articulated, foster a particular Christian ethical behavior, 
moral character, or attitude. This interconnected set of elements points toward an “identity” or, in 
Schweiker‟s words, a type of “moral integrity.”45 
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Ethics is a restless quest for coherence, an effort to make moral sense, a progressive attempt to 
achieve wholeness. Christian ethics is a desire to follow Christ. This quest has humble origins; it 
acknowledges our fragmentation, broken history, radical dependence, and limited ability to understand. 
Facing the daunting challenges posed by the current environmental crisis and our confused ethical 
climate, we still have hope and trust in the ability of the Christian tradition to provide the necessary 
moral resources and the guiding symbols to confront these challenges. In order to promote a new way of 
life on Earth, we need to retrieve traditional insights that have been either overlooked or misinterpreted 
in our own tradition. One of these insights, toward which I turn now, is the sacramental vision of the 
world and the dynamic of thankful gift exchanged displayed in Christian liturgies. 
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2. Sacramental liturgy and ethical responsibility toward creation 
 
“But this sacramental vision demands unflinching recognition of the poverty of one‟s own being – 
for many too terrible to be true – and joyful acceptance of the absolute agape that supports one‟s 
own being – for many too good to be true. This requires the expansion of the imagination.”46 
 
In Chapter 1 I reviewed various accounts of Christian responsibility and pointed to some important 
dimensions of this central moral concept. I explicitly avoided a strictly deontological understanding of 
responsibility, while opening it to a theological perspective. The current environmental degradation of 
the planet has drawn the attention of scientists, economists, politicians, and the mass media. Yet this 
crisis is a major concern for theologians and ethicists as well. The widespread crisis is not only a 
daunting problem but an excellent opportunity for the Christian tradition to revisit ethical foundations, 
distorted practices, and overlooked theological dimensions. One of the overlooked dimensions is 
Catholic sacramental theology. 
In this chapter I explore the ethical dimension of sacramental theology. I divide the chapter into two 
sections. First, building on Louis-Marie Chauvet, Don E. Saliers, and Gordon W. Lathrop, I argue that 
there is a circular relationship between sound sacramental liturgy and ethics. This previous clarification 
is required in order to move forward to the main point of the chapter: from the circular relationship 
between Christian ethics and sacramental liturgy flows an ethics of responsibility toward creation. It is 
an ethics grounded in the Eucharistic dynamic of gift-return. I will argue that the Eucharist is the central 
Christian story (Chapter 3); it is a story that orients moral responsibility toward the common good 
(Chapter 4). 
In the second part of the chapter, I try to make a contribution to Pope Benedict XVI‟s call for 
responsibility toward creation. I contend that one of the hidden assumptions underlying liturgies is an 
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out-dated and limited understanding of creation. This assumption needs to be corrected and put into 
dialogue with modern cosmological and ecological perspectives in order to develop a creation-oriented 
sacramental liturgy and an earth-caring Christian ethics. This dialogue between science and religion will 
be further explored in Chapter 3. I contend in this section that an ethics of Christian responsibility 
toward creation requires a double dynamic of attachment to and detachment from creation. This type of 
dynamic is already present in the Eucharist and can be stated as a dynamic of “wide-open senses” and 
“gift-return.” The sacramental vision displayed in the Eucharist depicts the tensional human-earth 
relationship and offers solid ground for a Christian ethics of responsibility toward creation.  
Finally, I suggest that a revisited diaconate is a good anthropological metaphor to foster responsibility 
toward creation. Deacons preach the gospel and serve the table, but also take care of the poor and the 
earth. Christian environmental ethics needs a sacramental vision, a revisited cosmology, a creation-
oriented liturgy, and a renewed understanding of human vocation as service to the poor and the earth. In 
short, sacramental liturgy brings together leitourgia and diakonia and offers an image of the human as a 
responsible, ecologically literate steward. 
 
2.1. Liturgy, sacraments, and ethics: Does a relationship exist? 
 
“To think liturgically and ethically is to try to help the Church discover connections by developing 
historical analogies, exploring philosophical and theological implications, and in the process to 
make normative recommendations.”47 
 
For contemporary liturgist and theologian Don E. Saliers, there is a connection that runs deep 
between sacramental liturgy and ethics. Saliers has stressed the importance of this connection and 
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considers liturgy as a “rehearsal” for the way we relate to one another and to the world. For Saliers, the 
“patterns of prayer, reading, proclamation, and sacramental action are precisely the practices of 
communal rehearsal of the affections and virtues befitting „life in Christ‟ … The symbolic forms and 
actions of liturgy are the school for conceiving and receiving such a pattern of life.”48  
The importance of this communal rehearsal and its influence in the social and political life has also 
been stressed by Gordon W. Lathrop. This author will rather use geographical metaphors to express the 
connection between liturgy and ethics, suggesting that liturgy offers a particular “orientation” for the 
believer in the world. According to Lathrop, sacramental liturgies like Baptism and Eucharist provide 
cosmological “maps” to the Christian assembly. Maps orient us in relation to important locations, to 
particular places. Metaphorical places like birth, life, death or community orient human life and are 
given great meaning and “cultural weight.” Worship orients the community in both time and space “in a 
world of meaning and meaningful action”49.  Human life is a journey in need of geographical references 
and cultural meaning. That is why liturgical orientation matters and has an ethical and political character 
for the Christian community. As Lathrop argues, “the Christian assembly can make modest though 
critically important proposals about economy and politics, can reorient us in the use of public symbols, 
and can show us the godly hole in our spheres and systems.”50 Christian liturgy orients its participants in 
the world; it offers a symbolic orientation.
51
 Moreover, liturgy would not only orient the community in 
space and time offering a geographical framework, but it would also offer active orientation in a 
particular direction. A particular active orientation toward action – urgos means action – displayed in the 
narrative dynamic of liturgy, the intercessory prayers, the collection for the poor, and the Eucharistic 
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shared meal. In short, liturgy appears to offer an orientation to the Christian assembly that has an 
inevitable ethical dimension.  
However, many people do not believe participation in the sacraments makes any difference in the 
“real life” of the believer. Critique and suspicion regarding the real influence of liturgy on political and 
social life have arisen over time. Political and economic interests have used liturgy as an instrument of 
control. Christian liturgy has also assimilated non-Christian traditions that have deformed its real 
character. Despite Saliers‟s and Lathrop‟s conviction regarding the connection between liturgy and 
ethics, this relationship still remains a very complex one. At least four critiques have questioned the very 
existence of this relationship.
52
 
First, postmodern critics have denied that liturgical practices form moral character at all. According 
to this critical analysis the amazing diversity of liturgies in history shows that each liturgical tradition 
has favored a set of canonical scriptures and particular practices, according to their local interests and 
concerns. As H. Paul Santmire points out: “Some postmodern critics of Christian ritual practices, to be 
sure, have claimed that the idea of a countercultural liturgy is a contradiction in terms, since the liturgy, 
by their definition, is essentially „cultural,‟ that is, the agency of the powerful …”53 To put it in different 
terms, postmodern critics believe that a shared liturgy or “common story” does not necessarily frame a 
single ethical understanding of Christian life.  
Second, sacraments are often interpreted as signs carrying an internal meaning. This meaning would 
be susceptible to being transferred to political and social action and, consequently, the lines between 
sacramental liturgy and ethics would be blurred. Some authors question whether this transfer of meaning 
does occur in practice. For example, as William T. Cavanaugh argues in Torture and Eucharist, the 
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assumption that sacraments‟ symbolic meaning can be directly applied to the world and the political 
sphere carries a hidden “gnostic” understanding of the sacraments.54 For Cavanaugh, liturgy is basically 
an “action,” not a meaningful sign susceptible to being translated into political categories. In theory, true 
liturgy should be a public, political performance. In practice, Cavanaugh believes, it is not. 
Third, Christian churches have too often domesticated Christian worship and turned it into an 
instrument of control and dominion. Liberation and feminist theologians have stressed the potential 
alienating power of Christian liturgy. Along these lines, Cavanaugh contends in his analysis of the 
Chilean Church during the Pinochet regime that torture was tolerated and downplayed by the Church 
because the Church had already “handed over the bodies of its members over to the state.”55 The 
Church‟s historical inability to be the real “body of Christ” supports the argument that Christian liturgies 
cannot really influence the ethical sphere.  
Finally, even assuming that the connection between ethics and liturgy does exist, we would need to 
weigh it against the overwhelming influence of mass media, lifestyles, and social rituals in shaping 
human character and praxis. As Saliers recognizes, “human beings are formed in myriad ways.”56 The 
influence of these social forces in a globalized world makes the hypothetic ethical-shaping character of 
liturgy appear rather pale. While trying to bring together ethics, liturgy, and sacramental theology, are 
we walking a tightrope? 
These four critiques pose a serious challenge to my thesis. They reveal the “gap” between everyday 
life and the real intentions and actions of the worshipping community. Yet, as Saliers observes, 
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“recognition of the gap itself is part of what authentic liturgy forms and expresses in our lives.”57 
Despite the many liturgical distortions and historical failures, the history of Christian liturgy not only 
provides arguments to look with suspicion at the relationship between liturgy and sacramental ethics, but 
also brings to the fore the fact that there are common liturgical and sacramental patterns across time and 
place. These patterns have to do with Christian initiation, sacred meals, daily prayer, taking care of the 
poor, healing, and burial. Christian liturgies do not simply absorb local cultures; they also discern 
incompatible practices and criticize specific behaviors. 
The Christian ethical imagination has historically been shaped by the Scriptures, lives of 
paradigmatic Christians, and Church institutions; it is constantly being shaped by the reading and 
preaching of the Scriptures and by ecclesiastical practices and rituals. Liturgy places important events in 
a “meaningful context” and leaves its stamp on public and private life alike. The notion of responsibility 
has an embedded meaning within the living Christian tradition through narratives, rituals, and practices. 
As Hans Bernhard Meyer argues, Christian liturgy “kept the experience of Christian brotherhood 
available through the centuries and prepared the ground for necessary social changes.”58 Sacramental 
practices, devotions, and works of mercy “allowed many elements of biblical Christianity to flow into 
the everyday lives of the people.”59 This scriptural “flow” into ethical praxis is mediated by the liturgical 
assembly; it has been embodied in communal practices. Worship is something people do together on a 
regular basis. Worshipping communities continuously meet to recall, sustain, and reenter the Christian 
tableau and find the motivation and the strength to commit themselves to the Kingdom. Confession and 
thanksgiving are just two examples of liturgical practices where the assembly recalls and “represents” on 
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stage the story of God and the human being. As Saliers contends, this permanent rehearsal is not just 
mechanical repetition or imitatio, but a deliberate communal rehearsal of the great narratives of creation 
and redemption, a rehearsal that articulates a shared story of faith and a common moral story.
60
 A 
similar historical argument has been provided by Santmire. As he argues, “the liturgy originally did 
function … sometimes has functioned … and arguably still can function – as a countercultural, 
community-forming ritual, for the sake of peace and justice and ecological hope.”61 
Of course, liturgy does not offer a solution to every moral dilemma in life. Liturgy probably will not 
extricate us from the ecological crisis. However, liturgy is necessary in order to sustain moral life and 
continually reenter the meaningful story that shapes Christian imagination and action. It becomes a 
powerful character-shaping rehearsal and a way to motivate ethical commitment and responsibility. As 
Lathrop argues, liturgy is a form of cultural “mapmaking” and, therefore, an exercise of power in 
itself.
62
 This statement on the power of liturgy does not imply we can use liturgy in a utilitarian way or 
as a political instrument for particular interests. Liturgy has a certain power and influence in shaping the 
community‟s moral imagination; therefore, it needs to be constantly revisited and critically analyzed. 
The liturgical shaping of the Christian ethos is always tempted to be isolated and disconnected from 
its source: Jesus Christ. Yet, no possible Christian ethics, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, will 
flow out from sacramental liturgy without a direct reference to Christ. When Christian liturgy forgets its 
Christological dimension it risks becoming mere story, empty discourse. That is why the relationship 
between liturgy, sacraments, and ethics has to be constantly re-examined with the Christological lens. 
As Saliers argues, there are persistent Christian practices with “overlapping narratives.” These practices 
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shape the character of the community and have a potential for self-revision.
63
 In other words, the 
constant hearing and healthy liturgical rehearsing of the Christian story questions and re-shapes the 
ethos of the community. Despite the many historical failures and abuses, as Saliers writes, “the worship 
of God raises the question, suddenly or slowly „How ought we to live?‟” 64 This question cannot be 
answered before we realize that the connection between liturgy, sacraments, and ethics is not linear, but 
circular. Put in slightly different terms, the interaction between sacramental liturgy and Christian ethics 
is a never-ending process, a circular relationship that needs to be constantly revisited. This circularity 
has been highlighted by Louis-Marie Chauvet in Symbol and Sacrament. 
Christian identity has a narrative and dialogical nature. It is a constant “dialogue” between three 
distinctive elements: storytelling-Scripture (sign), sacramental experience (symbol) and ethical behavior 
(praxis or ethics). These elements make up, in Chauvet‟s words, “the tripod of Christian identity.”65 We 
might be tempted to believe that being Christian is all about ethical behavior, or we might be inclined to 
think it has to do with particular rituals, or we could even affirm being Christian is to believe in a system 
of religious norms encoded in the Bible and Church teachings. Yet these three elements of Christian 
identity cannot be isolated or disconnected from the others; they have to be articulated. And this 
articulation has to be dynamic. Christian identity is articulated through narratives that shape the 
imagination and motivate action. Furthermore, Christian identity is formed by those activities in which 
we engage. Narratives and practices are internalized in a pre-reflexive way and summon us to a 
particular form of Christian-inspired life; they become part of our identity. This is why liturgy matters 
and why there is a certain priority of practice over theory; prayer and action tend to go first and 
reflection usually follows. Most biblical texts were written and compiled after a long period of oral use 
                                                          
63
 Cf. Saliers, “Afterword: Liturgy and Ethics Revisited.” In Liturgy and the moral self: humanity at full stretch before God: 
essays in honor of Don E. Saliers, 213. 
64
 Cf. Saliers, “Afterword: Liturgy and Ethics Revisited.” In Ibid., 215. 
65
 Louis Marie Chauvet, Symbol and sacrament: a sacramental reinterpretation of Christian existence (Collegeville, Minn.: 
Liturgical Press, 1995), 176. 
29 
 
in liturgical assemblies. Moral codes also arose as a reaction to practices considered incorrect by the 
community. In other words, liturgy and practice are sources of theological reflection; they are theologia 
prima. 
The explicit theological dimensions of liturgy and the narrative character of both Christian identity 
and sacramental liturgy have also been stressed by Lathrop. Building on Dominic T. Crossan‟s gospel 
analysis, Lathrop contends that there is a close relationship between the gospels‟ narrative structure and 
Christian sacramental liturgy. The structure of the gospels has shaped Christian liturgy, established 
assembly patterns, and fostered a distinctive Christian ethos. The structure of Mark‟s gospel influenced 
the other canonical gospels, became normative, and intertwined with Christian practices of the early 
Church. For Lathrop, the story of Emmaus (Lk 24: 13-35) is one of the paradigmatic stories of the 
Christian community where the connection between gospel narrative, sacramental liturgy, and assembly 
patterns is depicted. The story of Emmaus, as Chauvet has also noted, is a compelling scriptural 
argument for the deep connection between scripture, sacramental liturgy, and ethics. Narrative, meal, 
passion, resurrection, and mission constitute the inner ordo of Christian identity, liturgy, and practice.
66
  
This particular Christian ordo is not just a description of the Christian ethos; it implies a narrative 
commitment to materiality. It fosters a sacramental cosmology or, in Lathrops‟s words, “sarcophilic 
worldview.”67 In other words, the Christian ordo not only pays attention to biblical narratives and 
liturgical practices, it also expands its concern to the materiality of the whole world and to the history of 
all created beings. As Lathrop writes, “this ordo … inserts a community into the concrete history, 
including the „natural history,‟ of the earth.”68 The ethos that flows out from scriptural narratives and 
sacramental liturgy takes into account the whole materiality of creation. As I will try to argue in the next 
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section of this chapter, the Christian ethos rehearsed in sacramental liturgies is one of care and 
responsibility toward creation. 
 
2.2. Sacramental liturgy and ethical responsibility toward creation 
 
“To be responsible for creation is to open it, just as one opens the dense wholeness of a loaf of 
bread in order to share it.”69 
 
 
Pope Benedict XVI, in his 2010 World Day of Peace message, explicitly encouraged Christian 
responsibility toward creation.
70
 Does this recommendation require a review of Christian responsibility, 
and if so, what does it have to do with sacramental liturgy? The answer to the first question is yes. As 
Benedict XVI contends in Caritas in Veritate, “The Church has a responsibility toward creation and she 
must assert this responsibility in the public sphere.”71 Christian ethics needs to face the new moral 
problem posed by the rampant destruction of the planet. The answer to the second question is more 
complex and requires further explanations. First, it requires a working definition of creation. Second, it 
needs a sound understanding of the relationship between creation and human beings. As Christians, I 
will argue, this relationship is paradigmatically displayed in Christian sacraments, namely the 
Eucharistic dynamic of gift return. 
For Chauvet, there is a close connection between creation theology and responsibility: “the theology 
of creation proposes the emergence of a responsible word. To confess creation is to attain emergence of 
a responsible word. To confess creation is to attain freedom. The given of the universe is received as an 
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offer.”72 Christian responsibility toward creation means concern about and care for the materiality of the 
earth and the history of all created beings, present and future. Before continuing, it would be valuable to 
pause and consider the meaning of creation. I can then proceed to suggest how a creation-oriented 
sacramental liturgy can foster ethical responsibility. 
There are three different “schemes” or ways of understanding creation.73 The first one is the 
“artisanal” scheme, which is based on Genesis and has dominated Christian interpretation. In this model, 
causality is the main explanatory category. God appears as the “first cause” of a static universe created 
by God. Human beings re-create this action in their relation to nature. The second scheme is the 
“biological.” Here generation or emanation becomes the central category. This model is more dynamic 
than the previous one and fits better with modern theories of evolution and natural history. Yet, it still 
makes creation too dependent on an internal necessity. Finally, there is the “verbal” scheme, which is 
grounded on John 1 and the Christological cosmologies of Eph 1 and Col 1. This third model plunges us 
directly into the symbolic order of the sacraments and offers a more dynamic and flexible understanding 
of the relationship between God, creation and the person. According to Chauvet, the great advantage of 
this model is that it makes room for human creativity by respecting the autonomy of human action while 
fostering a sense of responsibility for the gift received via a dynamic of gift-return. As he puts it: “The 
Christian notion of creation, irreducible to human creativity (which nevertheless comes from it) but also 
indissolubly linked to it, thus expresses both human beings‟ dependence on God as creatures and their 
responsibility in history for the management of a universe and existence acknowledged as a free gift.”74 
Creation is a gift, Christ is a gift, and, as Pope Benedict XVI has recently stated, “we are a gift.”75 
The Eucharistic dynamic ritualizes and brings to the fore these central Christian beliefs. The Eucharistic 
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prayers are an explicit invitation for humans to constant transformation and re-creation of the gift 
received. For Saliers, “the Eucharistic prayers are the most intensive and extensive form of praise and 
thanksgiving in the Christian tradition.”76 As Chauvet puts it, in the Eucharist “the given of the universe 
is received as an offer.”77 This offering becomes an invitation to appreciate the gift and to praise God. 
As it is read in the prayer at the presentation of the gifts by the priest, “Blessed are you, Lord, God of all 
creation. Through your goodness we have this bread to offer, which earth has given and human hands 
have made.” These two sentences convey and express liturgically what an ethics of thankfulness and 
gift-return is all about; namely, opening up the gift received, in order to share it with others. This 
Eucharistic dynamic contains the seminal ideas of an ethical project grounded in a Catholic sacramental 
sensibility. In short, a Christian ethics of responsibility has to engage the believer in a dynamic of gift-
return. 
However, even when the gift has been acknowledged as a gift, the action of returning the gift is not 
just a matter of mere “paying back” or passive compensation. Gift-return implies responsive action and 
creative involvement with what was first received and is being returned. We never give back the very 
same gift we have received. Furthermore, giving back intends to be creative. In the offering we do not 
“give back” grapes and wheat, but bread and wine. The gift is transformed and recreated in a responsible 
answer. In other words, the Eucharistic dynamic, if well understood, implies responsibility and 
creativity. The Eucharistic offering or oblation expresses liturgically this kind of dynamic. The prayer at 
the presentation of the gifts is a gesture of appreciation for and disappropriation of the gift received. This 
gesture creates distance and detachment from the materiality of the gift, fostering not only gratitude but 
also respect and responsibility. In Chauvet‟s words, “this respect, which is a distancing, a detachment 
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from an all-devouring utilitarianism, opens up the opacity of the real.”78 Responsibility has to do with 
this “opening up” of the real once the real has been perceived as a gift. 
In other words, being responsible toward creation entails a tensional dynamic of attachment to and 
detachment from all created gifts, namely the kind of paradoxical and tensional dynamic rehearsed in 
Christian sacramental liturgy. On the one hand, it involves being close, getting attached, and awakening 
to our own reality as creatures and to the wider materiality of creation. It means saying thanks. 
Moreover, as I will argue later, in order to perceive creation as a gift there are basic liturgical 
requirements, namely, “coming to our senses” and “ecological literacy.” As Saliers reminds us, “without 
remembering that creation is a gift, without remembering that our lives are gifts … we can never begin 
to grasp the hope that is offered to us in the symbols, words, and the ritual actions of the Christian 
assembly.”79 On the other hand, Christian responsibility toward creation also requires a certain 
detachment and distance from all created things. It requires a discipline of self-giving, mourning, and 
dispossession. As I will argue at the end of this chapter, it requires an ethos of humility, self-giving, and 
service. So with all this being pointed out, the question now becomes: how can Christians be attached to 
and detached from the gift of creation in order to be responsible toward it? 
 
2.3. Responsibility as thankful gift-exchange 
2.3.1. Receiving the gift 
 
“Moral progress comes only as we learn to acknowledge our life as a gift.” 80 
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Being responsible toward creation first requires awakening to our own senses, the materiality of 
creation, and the consequences of our dwelling on earth. It requires attention, literacy, and “cultivating a 
sense of awe and wonder.”81 I refer to the type of awe and wonder Moses experienced in front of the 
burning bush (Cf. Ex 3:5-14). Responsibility toward creation first requires attachment to and 
appreciation for the natural world. The whole fabric of creation is threatened because of human voracity, 
selfishness, and slumber; reckless dwelling, disordered eating habits, constant moving, and greedy 
consumption are pushing the earth‟s ecosystems to the brink of collapse.  
It is commonly held that the Judeo-Christian tradition has de-sacralized the natural world. Yet 
Christians still believe that, in light of God‟s theophany in Sinai, the place on which they are standing 
can be “holy ground.” This belief has ethical implications. As Lathrop has emphasized, “the unique 
holiness of God does not exclude but rather entails the holiness of the ground, the bush, the surrounding 
ecology of things.”82 In order to perceive this “mediated holiness” in nature, we need to become 
“ecologically literate” and awaken to our embodied condition. We need to see ourselves as dependent 
and embedded in the complex network of life, namely creation. Creation is a gift entrusted to us and we 
need to know exactly what is happening to this gift. 
For Saliers, liturgy can play an important role in this recognition process. Awakening to our senses 
will certainly require the physical senses of hearing, seeing, touching, moving, smelling, and tasting. 
Moreover, it will require, as Lathrop points out, an embodied and “sarcophilic vision” of human nature 
and experience, a rejection of gnostic and dualistic temptations, and “a sensual reorientation in the 
world.”83 Furthermore, it will require reconnecting real life, sacramental symbolism, and meaningful 
worship through our senses. “Symbols without the life experiences of the believers brought to the liturgy 
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can indeed become empty.”84 For Saliers, true and relevant Christian worship is characterized by the life 
experiences or senses of awe, delight, truthfulness, and hope.
85
 
These four senses structure Christian sacramental liturgy and will inform ethical responsibility 
toward creation. We cannot be responsible for creation unless we first experience the grandeur of the 
natural world, the vastness of the universe, the complexity of the earth‟s ecosystems, the long 
evolutionary history of the earth, the immense power of human action, and – at the same time – the 
radical limitation of human life on earth. Awe, delight, truthfulness, hope, fear, and many other “senses” 
are profound human experiences found in the biblical stories, in daily human life, and in the natural 
world. They are basic “liturgical senses” that convey praise of God in creation.  
No wonder Catholic theologian Kevin W. Irwin insists on the importance of using creation in 
worship in order to truly praise God in liturgy. As he observes, “one of the purposes of liturgy and 
sacraments is to give voice and expression to the inarticulate but nonetheless real praise of God in 
creation by the very use of creation in worship.”86 Along these lines Edward Foley, in his study of the 
Eucharistic preparatory rites, alerts that “a very schizophrenic ritual now shapes the way the community 
thinks about creation.”87 He identifies three problematic aspects: the medieval hierarchical ordering 
between the people and the priest, radical discontinuity between God‟s creative and saving deeds, and 
tight boundaries around the gifts and their isolation from the food chain. These several suggestions and 
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critiques show the imperative for sacramental liturgy to go back to its biblical sources, foster a 
“sarcophilic attitude,” take creation into account, and “come to its senses.” 
The liturgical senses Saliers talks about not only foster reverence and praise of God in creation; they 
also foster ethical motivation and stimulate human reason. The quest for truth and the resulting awe of 
scientific discoveries impels science to participate in this human experience. That is why, for authors 
like Kevin W. Irwin, Richard N. Fragomeni, Gordon W. Lathrop and Lawrence E. Mick, cosmology and 
ecology need to be put into dialogue with theology and liturgy.
88
 The incorporation of modern scientific 
insights into Christian liturgy will not create confusion, but will perhaps foster a new creation-sensitivity 
and a sense of deep interdependence between the earth and the worshipping community. A 
scientifically-informed creation story will promote the sense of awe, delight, truthfulness, and hope 
characteristic of a healthy liturgy.  
For Fragomeni, this kind of revisited creation story would have an “impact on the religious 
imagination of Christian believers and on their relationships to each other and the world.”89 Building on 
Teilhard de Chardin and Thomas Berry, Fragomeni believes a new Christian cosmic narrative, a 
“revisited story of origins,” would have to be based upon empirical data, will have to demonstrate how 
everything is genetically related, and how in humanity the universe has become conscious of itself. This 
new cosmic creation story (or, as Lathrop would put it, “liturgical cosmology”) provides public symbols, 
meaning to existence, ordering of social authority, guidance, psychic energy, and can engage us in the 
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care of the earth.
90
 In other words, an ecologically-informed liturgy will bring the worshipping 
community to its senses and make it appreciative of the gift of creation.
91
 
According to Chauvet, the sacramental way of appreciating the gift is under the mode of oblation or 
thanksgiving. Sacraments are humankind‟s acts of thanksgiving toward God. In the Eucharistic prayer, 
the priest proclaims the Christian assembly‟s indebtedness and thankfulness to God: “it is our duty and 
our salvation, always and everywhere to give you thanks.” A particular ethics of thankfulness is 
rehearsed in the Eucharist. The assembly, acknowledging God‟s abundant gifts, finds its right place and 
its correct distance. It learns to praise, step back, and express thanks. It learns to return the gift. “It is in 
giving thanks, in giving back to God God‟s own Grace, Christ given in sacrament, that we are given 
back to ourselves.”92 At this point, once sacramental liturgy has shown that creation is a gift and our 
lives are gifts, the second dimension of an ethics of gift-return has to be addressed. 
2.3.2. Giving thanks and praise 
 
“Human beings should accept them with gratitude and, even adopting a Eucharistic attitude with 
regard to every element of creation, to give thanks to God for them.”93 
A renewed Christian liturgy, then, will promote deeper sensible attachment to nature and an 
appreciation for creation as a gift. The first dimension of the gift-return dynamic, getting close to 
creation, is a necessary step to foster Christian responsibility toward creation. However, Christians 
cannot get “too close” and praise creation; Christians give thanks for creation but are not nature-
worshippers. As Christians we need to step back and renounce all temptation to worship or keep the gift. 
A sound ethics of responsibility toward creation informed by the Eucharistic dynamic of gift-return 
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requires a second step; it requires appreciation, detachment, and service. We need to step back and offer 
the gift. That is what the great rehearsal of the Eucharist and the central Christian invitation are all 
about: returning the gift.  
The main problem is that we are too comfortable mastering the world, keeping the gift, and enjoying 
its benefits. As Chauvet argues, “this is why, in a culture whose foundation is a long metaphysical and 
technical tradition of the critical „inspection‟ of the real, the required dispossession of mastery is so 
difficult for us to accept with serenity.”94 The success of modern technology is one of the main reasons 
why the primacy of the possessive, the immediate, and the utilitarian have become central elements of 
Western civilization. But this mastery of the world has many destructive side-effects for both humans 
and non-humans. The increasing destruction of the earth‟s ecosystems is one of the most obvious side-
effects of this centuries-long process of control and mastery. Human relations have not been left 
untouched either. The technological age, with its unquestionable gifts and opportunities, is also 
destroying human communities and the very fabric of creation. Many signs of social breakdown and 
injustice are connected to this cultural mastery brought by modern technology. The technological 
acceleration that has created the huge divide between rich and poor countries is bringing many 
traditional cultures to the brink of extinction. The supremacy and accelerated control of humans over all 
other beings is showing itself as unsustainable and destructive for all.  
At this historical impasse, sacramental liturgy can make a valuable contribution.  As Santmire writes: 
“The first and definitive act in the life of the liturgically molded believer is to step back and to 
contemplate all the wonders of God‟s gracious acts, as Creator, Savior, and Consummator, more 
particularly, in our view here, wonders that are given in the world of nature, by grace alone- and to be 
grateful.”95 Liturgy teaches us to stand firm against the temptation of mastery and to recognize God as 
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the ultimate and only true master of heaven and earth. As the assembly acknowledges in the response to 
the preface of the Eucharist prayer: “Holy, holy, holy Lord, God of power and might, heaven and earth 
are full of your glory, Hosanna in the highest.” This public praise of God‟s power and might is an 
antidote for human hubris. We need to repeat again and again, “it is right to give God thanks and 
praise.” The Eucharistic dynamic of gift-return points toward an ethics of contemplation, simplicity, 
praise, and responsible detachment. In other words, healthy sacramental liturgies foster a Eucharistic 
ethic of contemplation and gift-return.  
Sacramental liturgy can teach us to renounce the ambition for mastery, to let-it-be, step back, 
contemplate, and do “nothing.” Liturgy opens up a space of gratuitousness that is by definition non-
measurable, non-controllable. We are not in control of the sacrament “rehearsed.” Sacramental liturgy is 
a barrier before our desire to dominate.
96
 As Chauvet puts it, “the ritual rupture performs a symbolic 
function that is extremely beneficial to faith. It creates an empty space with regard to the immediate and 
utilitarian.”97 This distance or empty space is key to liturgy and plays a pedagogical role: it opens the 
subject to the experience of mystery, the experience of grace. Parallel to this experience of detachment 
runs the experience of radical human limitation.  
I pointed out in Chapter 1 that recognition of human limitation and sin are necessary ethical 
dimensions of Christian responsibility. As Santmire has showed, “(an) awareness of individual and 
corporate sinfulness permeates the liturgy, from beginning to ending, and comes to expression in acts of 
confession, hymnody, proclamation, and in the Eucharistic rite itself.”98 The Kyrie, Agnus Dei or the 
prayer before communion: “Lord, I am not worthy to receive you, but only say the word and I shall be 
healed” make the assembly acknowledge human sin and God‟s power. Liturgy expresses in a non-
rational way our limitation and radical dependence on God as creatures. 
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The experience of sin, human limitation, and detachment is the type of experience we so desperately 
need in this time of technological mastery of the real. The necessary ritual distance displayed in liturgy 
shows that we are not in control – God is. Despite humanity‟s incredible technological achievements and 
scientific discoveries, we need to realize the radical limitation of all human knowledge and action; we 
need to acknowledge creation as God‟s gift, step back, appreciate, and return the gift. Otherwise, we 
would be praising idols. This is the kind of distance and space sacramental liturgies can teach in our 
present age of dominion and technological control.
99
 
Finally, sacramental liturgies not only invite us to step back, remove our sandals, praise the Lord, and 
recognize the gifts of creation. Furthermore, they invite us to return what we have received and give 
ourselves back following Christ‟s total self-giving. As Chauvet puts it, “rendering to God what God 
gives us is to dispossess ourselves not only of something but of our very selves.”100 It is no wonder that 
John Paul II explicitly connected the Eucharistic dynamic of gift-return with Christian ethics. As the 
Pope wrote: “All of us who take part in the Eucharist are called to discover, through this sacrament, the 
profound meaning of our actions in the world … and to receive from it the strength to commit ourselves 
ever more generously, following the example of Christ, who in this sacrament lays down his life for his 
friends.”101 Sacramental liturgy in general and the Eucharist in particular is a source of ethical 
motivation, self-giving, and an explicit invitation to renounce the ambition for mastery.
102
 In short, 
Christian sacramental liturgy is a solid ground upon which to build a Christian ethics of responsibility. 
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2.4. The responsible self as deacon 
 
And here is where sacramental liturgy and Christian ethics enter into fruitful dialogue, where 
leitourgia and diakonia meet. I pointed out in the introduction that a Christian ethics of environmental 
responsibility toward creation needs a creation-oriented liturgy, a dynamic of gift-return, and an 
understanding of human vocation as service to the poor and the earth. I have so far treated the first two 
requirements. Now, in order to complete this discussion, I would like to briefly point out that the 
Christian diaconate offers a valid anthropological metaphor for our present time of environmental 
breakdown and moral disorientation. As Lathrop argues, “the basis of the moral agency in the Christian 
life is diakonia.”103 The ministry of deacon is a powerful metaphor that brings together the liturgical, 
sacramental, and ethical dimension of Christian life. Deacons are at the crossroad of a renewed 
sacramental liturgy and an ethics of Christian responsibility toward creation.
104
 
The ordination of deacons concludes with the presentation of the Book of the Gospels, namely the 
story of Jesus and the early Christian Church. On that day, three short sentences confront the deacon as 
the bishop presents him with the book of the gospel: “Believe what you read. Teach what you believe. 
Practice what you teach.” These sentences sum up how Christian service proceeds; it starts by hearing 
and believing the story (scripture), follows by bringing the story to others (teaching and preaching), and 
ends by acting and rehearsing this story (ethics or service).
105
 Every deacon, therefore, is called to 
believe, teach, and practice the Gospel of Jesus, the particular Christian story. The Eucharistic dynamic 
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of gift-return is not just a model for ordained ministers; it is an invitation to anyone who hears the story. 
It is the ethical invitation that flows out from the Eucharistic gift-return dynamic. Scientifically-
informed interpretations of biblical narratives, creation-oriented liturgies, and an understanding of 
Christian vocation as service will shape the Christian imagination and foster a distinctive ethics of 
responsibility toward creation. 
The crossroads between sacramental liturgy and ethics has proved to be a fruitful ground to cultivate 
the gift-return dynamic and appreciate creation, rehearsing again and again the very self-giving dynamic 
displayed in liturgy. The rehearsal of this dynamic, though, needs, as I have pointed out several times so 
far, a shared narrative or common story. This narrative will have to pay attention to both religious and 
scientific accounts of nature and humans beings. I turn now my attention toward the necessary narrative 
dimension of Christian responsibility. 
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3. The narrative character of Christian responsibility 
 
 
A consistent narrative is a coherent framework that takes account of the various dimensions of the 
human place in the cosmos. The previous chapter argued that the story of Jesus displayed in sacramental 
liturgies is the keystone of any Christian moral reflection and the founding narrative of Christian ethics. 
The most primitive formulation of the Christian faith has a narrative structure, namely the story of Jesus 
the Christ.
106
 For Christians, the central narrative is the Eucharist and the sacramental vision flowing out 
from this story. A particular vision of the human as a steward or deacon, I pointed out in the previous 
chapter, emerges from this vision. 
In the first part of this chapter, I argue that we live, for a number of historical and philosophical 
reasons, in a world of fragmented narratives. However, despite the fragmentation and moral 
disorientation of our time, I contend that the dialogue between science and religion is providing a set of 
anthropological themes upon which a sound understanding of responsibility can be built. In the second 
part, I argue that in telling a more humble story regarding human existence, the emerging narrative not 
only corrects previous theological misunderstandings, but also offers a more holistic view of human 
beings as interrelated with and dependent on the earth‟s ecosystems. This image of dependent persons-
in-community matches traditional Christian insights, corrects misinterpretations of the imago Dei theme, 
fosters the idea of indebtedness, and promotes a shared responsibility for the well-being of our global 
earth system. 
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3.1.  Consistent narratives and moral responsibility 
 
“The loss of the capacity for narrative would amount to the ultimate disempowering of the human 
subject, for without narrative there is no continuity between present and past, and therefore no 
responsibility, and therefore no possibility of acting together to govern ourselves.”107 
A sound understanding of responsibility requires community-mediated knowledge and socially-
constructed linguistic categories. Knowledge and interpretation do not take place outside of a 
community or particular narrative tradition; neither does responsibility. Communities are formed by 
stories and constantly re-enter these stories to find sustenance and guidance. The story of Emmaus, as 
Jean-Marie Chauvet has persuasively argued, is a particularly fine example of the narrative structuring 
of the early Christian community.
108
  
The importance of telling the Christian story again and again becomes an ethical exercise and an 
ecclesial necessity. Stanley Hauerwas has creatively argued in A Community of Character that any 
ethical account involves a narrative. As he writes, “the „ethical problem‟ is not one just of decision, but 
of description and interpretation as well.”109 Hauerwas‟s point is that “truthful narratives” provide an 
adequate account of the community‟s existence and resources to draw on in times of crisis.110 As he 
writes, “there is no way to speak of Jesus‟ story without its forming our own. The story it forms creates a 
community which corresponds to the form of his life.”111 That is why, for Hauerwas, biographies of 
saints and narratives of discipleship matter. He argues that Christian biographies are not only a form of 
piety, but “a social ethics.”112 The stories of other Christians shape our imagination, guide our action, 
and become an ethical and political activity. Hauerwas‟s insistence on narrative is pertinent at this point 
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for two interconnected reasons. First, it reminds us that we need a consistent narrative of human beings 
and nature able to undergird a robust ethics of ecological responsibility toward nature. Second, the 
search for such a robust narrative brings to the fore the daunting academic and moral challenge of our 
time: the increasing specialization and fragmentation of scientific and ethical debates. I will briefly 
comment on the latter before turning to the former. 
We live, for a number of complex historical reasons, in a fragmented moral universe. This 
fragmentation is seen in endless ethical debates and in the ultimate inability of modern moral 
philosophers to solve these problems and reach a common ground. According to Alasdair McIntyre, 
three different accounts dominate the current ethical landscape in Western societies.
113
 Rooted in the 
Aristotelian tradition and in line with “communitarian” thinkers, MacIntyre is deeply concerned about 
the disorientation of current moral discourse. He believes Western civilization has reached a turning 
point and needs to move forward. At the end of his seminal work, After Virtue, he writes: “what matters 
at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual 
and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us.”114 We may or 
may not agree with MacIntyre‟s bleak picture and local-oriented solution, but we certainly need to 
acknowledge the narrative and moral fragmentation of our time while facing the increasing social 
disintegration of many Western societies and the “dark ages” of environmental degradation that are 
already upon us.
115
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3.2. Fragmented narratives, ethical disorientation 
 
Perhaps somewhat ironically, the current social, political and environmental fragmentation is 
especially visible in our global, interconnected, multicultural cities. As I pointed out above, Jonathan 
Sacks is profoundly concerned about the rising and frightening social fragmentation in Western societies 
and has argued that a new type of covenant or “shared narrative” is required to bridge the growing 
cultural gap between different groups. Influenced by McIntyre, Sacks contends that story-telling is a 
very ancient, and indeed effective, form of society-building. A form of societal covenant is renewed 
through communal story-telling. Telling stories is not only “part of being human,” but a political action 
as well. For Sacks, contrary to what Jean-Francois Lyotard believed, we do need meta-narratives or big 
stories, “the ones that tell us who we are, where we came from, and what we are called on to do … 
Without memory, there is no identity, and without identity we are cast adrift into a sea of chance, 
without compass, map or destination.”116 In short, without a shared narrative, there is no shared 
responsibility. 
A similar fragmentation and disorientation affects the field of environmental ethics. Michael 
Northcott has described four distinct schools or perspectives on the present environmental crisis. These 
various approaches are not only legitimate “methodological options,” but stem from distinct 
understandings of human beings and their place in the world. According to Northcott, ecocentric, 
deontological, utilitarian, and “eco-virtuous” approaches sum up the different philosophical attempts to 
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understand and solve the current crisis. When it comes to Christian theology, humanocentric, ecocentric, 
and theocentric perspectives also offer different images of the human and its place in the cosmos.
117
  
Willis Jenkins has analogously argued that particular anthropological and cosmological narratives 
influence the Christian ethos. These narratives are themselves shaped by patterns of basic Christian 
experience, what he calls “grammars of grace:” “the metaphors, logics and narratives of grace shape 
major patterns of Christian response to environmental problems.”118 This narrative or “grammatical” 
exploration leads Jenkins to identify three distinct theologies of grace within the Christian tradition: 
sanctification, redemption, and deification. These theologies correspond, broadly speaking, to three 
major Christian traditions: Catholicism and mainstream Protestantism, Evangelical Protestantism, and 
Eastern Orthodoxy, respectively. In other words, different implicit anthropologies foster different ethical 
approaches to the ecological crisis. 
Given the present ethical fragmentation and the uncertainty of scientific predictions, it may be 
difficult to imagine a single, unified meta-narrative. Yet it is increasingly obvious that we certainly have, 
as Paul Knitter contends, “meta-problems.” One of these meta-problems, affecting us all, is the 
“ecological meta-problem.”119 We may never agree on a single narrative binding all the peoples on 
earth. Scientist may never be able to predict with complete certainty the effects of human action on the 
ecosystems. However, we can agree on a number of pressing environmental and social problems.
120
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have repeatedly argued that we need a common, inclusive story able to generate the binding energy and 
moral commitment necessary to build and sustain a common ethical project in a livable world. However, 
the contrary also holds true: without a shared responsibility, there will be no shared narrative. Our 
shared narrative is the great common ethical project of preserving the earth. This ethical project is, 
borrowing the title of Thomas Berry‟s book, “the great work” of our time.121 
But let us return to Sacks for a moment. His assessment of contemporary reality is surely worth 
affirming. His insistence on building a common narrative in multicultural societies is accurate and 
timely. He argues that ethical commitment and social engagement is the first step in the shared ethical 
narrative we build together. Praxis precedes theory. The starting point of our shared story is our common 
ethical praxis. Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, and atheists now live together in cities like 
London, New York, and Paris. We all now share the same virtual world of the internet. We have 
different and conflicting religious, moral, and political narratives. Yet there are common concerns and 
practices that can be put into dialogue in order to promote a shared civic narrative. Sacks‟s effort to 
bridge the “narrative gap” between traditions is important and needs to be taken into account. However, 
in spite of his bridging effort, Sacks forgets an influential and pervasive narrative: the one offered by 
contemporary sciences.  
On the one hand, all religious traditions confront a powerful flow of rapidly-changing scientific 
narratives that is throwing into question the previous anthropological, cosmological, and moral stories of 
each tradition. The scientific narrative flow is reshaping and challenging all these previous stories.
122
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the other hand, we are witnessing a rising religious fanaticism, anti-scientific attitude, and growing 
tension within religions. These reactions are partially due to the scientific challenge posed to traditional 
religious narratives. 
Our world faces a dilemma that taps deep into the fragmentation brought about by modernity: we 
have several religious and “regional” stories alongside a powerful flow of techno-scientific narratives. 
According to many of our contemporaries, especially in the West, religions no longer offer an over-
arching view of history, humanity, and the cosmos in conformity with the narrative offered by the 
natural sciences. For many scientists, religions offer only a naïve, flawed story that needs to be 
superseded; they claim that contemporary science provides a more accurate view of the origin of life, 
human beings, and the universe. Moreover, as Francisco Ayala has noted, these scientific claims are 
often illegitimately extended into ethical prescriptions. The new scientific and old religious accounts 
appear to be in opposition, or at least in a very tense relationship. However, in spite of the prestige of 
scientific descriptions, they have not fostered a unified ethical framework and new sustaining values. As 
a result, elements of the “old” stories not only remain but seem to be quite resilient. Still, both religious 
and scientific stories thrive and cohabit in our current post-modern, scientific age. In sum, “we are in 
between stories.”123 
 
3.3. Science meets religion: mending the narrative? 
 
We need a common moral ground in order to build sustainable and responsible human communities. 
This type of common moral ground not only should take into account scientific understandings of nature 
and the human being, but also will require a shared vision and a narrative capable of depicting, in 
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accordance with the natural sciences, “the human place in the cosmos.”124 In other words, we need a 
consistent anthropology and cosmology. A unified story of the human, I believe, will provide moral 
resources for human communities to find their place in the world and, hence, exercise genuine 
responsibility toward the natural world. 
At this point in my reflection there are two options. First, I could nostalgically look back, as 
MacIntyre seems to propose, toward a pre-modern, unified narrative like the one that provided for 
centuries a common moral ground in Western Europe. Or I could try to move forward and blend 
together in a new synthesis the best insights from the Christian tradition, valuable perceptions from 
modernity, and contributions made by contemporary science. Given the accelerated pace of scientific 
discovery and the complexity of human response to change, this blending process will be a never-
accomplished task. However, taking the road of dialogue is a necessary step in order to provide the type 
of narrative we desperately need to foster a renewed sense of responsibility for the future of life on the 
planet. This new synthesis is a major challenge to religious traditions, natural sciences, and humanities 
alike. 
But there is still hope. Christians have faced similar challenges before. The Cappadocian Fathers 
creatively confronted the challenge posed by Greek philosophy to Christian beliefs in the first centuries 
of the Christian era. The Fathers of the Church borrowed models, metaphors, analogies, and symbols 
from the Greek philosophical tradition in order to create a comprehensible synthesis. This is the type of 
synthesis we find in the early Christian creeds of the Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, and 
Chalcedon.  Analogously, Thomas Aquinas created a new theological synthesis in the Middle Ages. His 
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Summa Theologiae is an effort to integrate both the rediscovered Aristotelian philosophy and previous 
Christian formulations. Today, we find ourselves at a similar historical crossroads. 
A Ptolemaic cosmology and a biblical-based story prevailed during the medieval European period 
and held communities together in a single meta-narrative. This vision was widely accepted and provided 
a unified ethical framework. For Thomas Berry, the Black Death that swept across Europe in the mid-
fourteenth century with its tragic effects was a turning point in Western history; it disturbed the previous 
“unified story.” According to Berry, the rise of the scientific method, Puritanism, Jansenism, the 
Protestant Reformation, and various eighteenth-century revolutionary movements contributed to the 
progressive shattering of this unified narrative. A new, challenging “secular story” in which modern 
science became the most authorized voice slowly emerged and has continued to be the main challenge to 
religious narratives. Today, we find ourselves in a situation similar to the one in which Thomas Aquinas 
or the Cappadocian Fathers found themselves. We need a fruitful dialogue between contemporary 
science and theology, a dialogue that must aim to clarify the nature of human beings and provide a 
consistent narrative of our place in the cosmos. 
Back in the late 1920s, Max Scheler argued that the term “human being” conveys three irreconcilable 
ideas in the West, namely the thoughts of the Jewish-Christian tradition, ancient Greek philosophy, and 
the natural sciences. These three ideas “lack any underlying unity which could provide us with a 
common foundation.”125 Scheler‟s influential work, The Human Place in the Cosmos, was an early 
attempt to bridge the gap between these different anthropological understandings and build a consistent 
philosophical anthropology in dialogue with both contemporary science and religion.  
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British theologian and biochemist Arthur Peacocke represents a renewed effort to foster this type of 
dialogue and bridge the widening gap between science and religion. According to Peacocke, science and 
theology share many things in common. Both scientific training and serious theological research 
involve, as the word already implies, self-discipline, openness, attentiveness, and willingness to engage 
in dialogue. As any committed student knows, serious research requires humility, patience, and 
ascetism. All these attitudes are shared by both theology and science.
126
 Furthermore, both science and 
religion engage in realities beyond description. Both need symbols, models, and a carefully defined, 
metaphorical language. Both share a narrative necessity. As he notes, “both science and theology have 
only the resources of human language.”127 Yet these are limited resources; human language is partial and 
cannot attempt to offer a complete and definite understanding of reality.  
In recent decades, the acknowledged shared limitations of science and theology have also led them to 
re-discover a new humility. On the one hand, natural sciences have realized that they cannot answer all 
questions “from their own purview and by their own methods.”128 After three hundred years of scientific 
inquiry, despite their great achievements, natural sciences have been unable to provide meaning and 
significance for the individual in the universe. They are a major source of intelligibility for humanity but 
cannot provide purpose and meaning for life.
129
 On the other hand, as apophatic theology has 
underscored over the centuries, theologians must recognize that ultimately they do not know what they 
are talking about; that is to say, God. Theology then has to two tasks. First, it has to recognize its own 
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radical limitation. Second, it must acknowledge that we live in a scientific age and “should seek to be at 
least consonant with scientific perspectives on the natural world.”130 Edward O. Wilson has recently 
made a similar point: “science faces in ethics and religion its most interesting and possibly humbling 
challenge, while religion must somehow find the way to incorporate the discoveries of science in order 
to retain credibility. Religion will possess strength to the extent that it codifies and puts into enduring, 
poetic form the highest values of humanity consistent with empirical knowledge.”131 
Over the last three centuries, natural sciences have been providing new insights regarding human 
nature and its place in the cosmos. Now they are painting a tableau of the human that corrects the 
previous modern, mechanistic view and, paradoxically, partly overlaps with the biblical understanding 
of the human. As Peacocke notes, there are many strands of the fabric of the sciences that “are 
congenital to traditional Christian theology.”132 Furthermore, I argue that, although several elements of 
our biblical tradition still need to be rethought in the light of current scientific discoveries, some of the 
shared narrative elements between science and religion are already providing a common ground in their 
understanding of human beings. These shared narrative elements are a coherent framework that takes 
account of the different dimensions of the human place in the cosmos, a common ground that offers 
hope in the search for a shared ethical commitment. This shared narrative is, according to Hauerwas, a 
form of “revealed reality” and a source of images and analogies that help us interpret human 
existence.
133
 To this emerging story I now turn. 
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3.4. Anthropological misunderstandings 
 
“For although humanity may still be held to be unique and to have a distinct place in the purposes 
of God, this status now has to be seen as a position of responsibility for the rest of all that is 
created.”134 
Before I move forward in trying to flesh out the emerging anthropological themes provided by 
contemporary science and contemporary Christian theology, an important point has to be acknowledged: 
neither the Christian Church nor the natural sciences have an “official anthropology.” There is no single, 
unified understanding of human beings. If we look at the Bible and the Christian tradition, we will find 
several implicit perspectives of the human and its place in the cosmos. If we look at the humanities and 
the natural sciences, we also face a plurality of views. The very term human being is indeed ambiguous 
and, as I pointed out above, conveys several meanings. I contend, however, that there are basic 
theological themes that outline a sound Christian anthropology in accordance with contemporary 
scientific understandings. 
My purpose in this final part of the chapter is threefold. First, I summarize, taking the Second Vatican 
Council‟s Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes as a guide, the basic elements of a Christian 
anthropology while trying to clarify the meaning of the contested doctrinal theme of the Imago Dei. 
Second, I argue that Charles Taylor‟s critique of modern, “atomistic” anthropologies parallels some of 
the corrections made to “modern worldviews” by contemporary science. Finally, I suggest that defining 
anthropological elements shared by both contemporary science and Christian theology converge in an 
emergent vision of human beings as persons-in-relation. This emerging anthropological theme, I argue, 
is a provisional common ground upon which a shared ethical commitment can be fostered. 
  
                                                          
134
 Peacocke, Theology for a scientific age: being and becoming natural, divine and human, 248. 
55 
 
3.4.1. A renewed imago Dei 
 
Gaudium et Spes (GS) offers a sound synthesis of Christian anthropology.
135 
The Church believes 
that human beings were created, out of love, in the image of God. The Imago Dei doctrinal theme 
occupies a central place in theological anthropology. This doctrine affirms that humans are created “in 
the image of God” in order to enjoy personal communion with the Trinity and with one another. 
Moreover, all of creation – not only humans – is made out of love. Love, companionship, and 
communion – not isolation or autonomy – express the profound human identity. As the Council notes, 
“God did not create man as a solitary” (GS, 12). Although man finds his true identity in community, the 
mystery of sin compels him to break this communion; hence “man is split within himself.” This division 
has personal, communitarian, and cosmic consequences. In breaking the original communion, “man has 
disrupted also his proper relationship to his own ultimate goal as well as his whole relationship toward 
himself and others and all created things” (GS, 13). 
However, in spite of sin and its dire effects, man is still one. In contrast to dualistic understandings of 
humans, the Council argues that humans are a unity of body and soul. Moreover, through their bodies, as 
natural sciences affirm, humans are chemically and biologically intertwined with the natural world: 
“through his bodily composition he gathers to himself the elements of the material world” (GS, 14). Put 
in more classical terms, humans are a micro-cosmos; they are deeply connected to and dependent on the 
natural world, and this connection is indeed good. Humans are, through their bodies, an integral part of 
the cycles of energy and matter in the cosmos. Furthermore, because of their material nature, like all 
other living beings, they grow, deteriorate, and disintegrate. A person is utterly finite and limited and, at 
some point, has to face “the utter ruin and total disappearance of his own person.” (GS, 18) 
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Of all these long-held Christian anthropological claims I have just summarized, the imago Dei is the 
one that has come, especially after the modern period, under systematic critique. According to the 
International Theological Commission (ITC), secular critics, modern science, and twentieth-century 
Western theology have criticized the theme of the imago Dei.
136
 Contemporary critics blame this 
particular theological theme for fostering flawed “anthropocentric” claims while promoting a disregard 
for the natural environment. 
However, although the theme of the imago Dei has been widely criticized, the Catholic tradition has 
recently reaffirmed its centrality for Christian faith while addressing these critiques. The ITC has 
acknowledged the emphasis on human dominion over nature and the influence of dualistic 
anthropologies, both Platonic and Cartesian, within Christian theology. These negative influences have 
been present in one form or another throughout Christian history and need to be purged. The imago Dei 
has been reformulated by the ITC as follows: “the human person as a whole is the bearer of the divine 
image in a spiritual as well as a bodily dimension” (ITC, 31). The recovery and emphasis on the “bodily 
dimension” not only corrects previous dualistic distortions, but also undergirds my thesis of an emerging 
anthropology of persons-in-relation (with both their bodies and the whole cosmos) in accordance with 
the Christian tradition and contemporary science.  
In summary, the bodily dimension of human beings matters for a number of reasons: it is an integral 
part of the theological theme of the imago Dei, is essential to personal identity, underscores human 
kinship with other life forms, helps us locate our place in the cosmos, and, indirectly, fosters 
“responsible stewardship of the created world” (ITC, 4). As the ITC concludes, “the theme of the imago 
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Dei has demonstrated its systematic power in clarifying many truths of the Christian faith. It helps us to 
present a relational - and indeed personal - conception of human beings” (ITC, 95). 
3.4.2. Atomistic anthropologies 
 
It is perhaps permissible at this point in the reflection to turn our attention to the work of Charles 
Taylor in order to unveil some of the underlying assumptions of modern anthropology. Taylor has 
argued that a particular vision of human beings and society fostered the rise of social contract theories in 
the seventeenth century. Since that time, the success of these theories in the West, especially the 
English-speaking world, has made rights-theory the paradigm of political thought. For Taylor, this 
paradigm makes anthropological claims and tells a very particular story about the human being and its 
place in society and the world. The main anthropological claim underlying modern Western societies 
and politics deals with the self-sufficiency of the individual. Human beings in society are “atoms” or 
individuals, while society is the sum and interaction of these individuals.  
This atomic anthropology “represents a view about human nature and the human condition which 
makes a doctrine of the primacy of rights plausible.”137 However, the main contradiction of atomism is 
that rights cannot be defended without first affirming the worth of “human capacities” that go well 
beyond atomistic assumptions. According to Taylor, these human capacities are “the right to life, to 
freedom … to the exercise of their moral or religious beliefs.”138 Human capacities shape the very 
identity and autonomy of the individual. As Taylor argues, human capacities are generated in a “social 
matrix”. In other words, “atomic individuals” cannot generate by themselves the very distinctive 
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features upon which they rely.
139
 Hence, for Taylor, the modern claim of an independent individual in an 
idealized and “natural state” is built upon a flawed story. Human capacities are not developed in a wild 
and isolated state but in the family and the broader history of a culture or civilization. Every culture is a 
socially-constructed narrative given to the individual. Furthermore, so-called “human capacities” are not 
just something given to be used, but an invitation for personal responsibility and concern for the culture 
that provided them. As Taylor contends, “any proof that these capacities can only develop in society or 
in a society of a certain kind is a proof that we ought to belong to or sustain society or this kind of 
society.”140 In short, we cannot develop the “capacity to be responsible” unless we first move beyond 
“atomistic anthropologies” and offer a more accurate and inclusive understanding of the human place in 
the cosmos. 
Environmental ethics is not the major concern for Taylor, yet his reflection makes a valuable 
contribution to the topic of this study. As we try to move beyond the current narrative impasse, Taylor‟s 
critique of modern anthropology appears as a useful stepping stone on our way. We aim to build livable 
human societies in harmony with the natural world. We want to foster livable and sustainable human 
communities where human and nonhumans can live together. As a result, we need a common narrative, 
sound anthropology, and sense of belonging to a shared ethical project. Modern atomistic and 
mechanistic views of the human (and the cosmos) are unable to provide an accurate narrative and foster 
a shared ethical response. The story told by atomistic anthropologies has proven too weak to promote 
the desired responsibility. 
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3.4.3. Human beings as persons-in-relation: An emerging anthropology? 
 
“Christians have the responsibility to locate the modern scientific understanding of the universe 
within the context of the theology of creation. The place of human beings in the history of this 
evolving universe, as it has been charted by modern sciences, can only be seen in its complete 
reality in the light of faith, as a personal history of the engagement of the triune God with 
creaturely persons” (ITC, 62). 
Both misunderstandings of the imago Dei and flawed atomistic anthropologies have distorted the 
primeval human reality, namely that we are integral parts of the cosmos or “beings-in-relation” rather 
than vagrant sovereigns or isolated individuals. Renewed theological interest in the imago Dei theme, 
widespread critique of the modern agenda, and “correcting” insights of contemporary sciences are 
helping to remedy these misunderstandings. From these diverse influences, a new narrative of the human 
is slowly emerging.  
First, both science and religion argue that humans are an intrinsic part of the natural world. We are 
deeply connected to and dependent on the geo-bio-chemical cycles of the earth. As the ITC notes, 
“human beings have developed a heightened awareness that they are organically linked with other living 
beings” (ITC, 71). The belief in human autonomy and detachment from the natural world has to be 
nuanced. While acknowledging the “special place” of human beings in the natural world, we need to 
acknowledge the radical dependence and interconnection of all beings of earth. Moreover, we are not 
only connected with the planet through our bodies, but we are also organically linked to the energy and 
geo-bio-chemical exchanges of the universe. Furthermore, we are genetically related to all forms of life 
as well. We live in an evolutionary universe and share a common kinship with all other living beings. In 
spite of our specific role in the natural world, great technological achievements, medical breakthroughs, 
and amazing transformative power, both science and religion realize that human life on earth is deeply 
related and totally dependent on basic natural elements like water, oxygen, minerals, plants, and 
animals. 
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Second, like all other living beings on earth, human beings are finite and radically limited. We not 
only depend on other beings for our survival, but our bodily life is temporal and, as Martin Heidegger 
argued, is ultimately oriented toward death. The physically and temporally finite reality of life has been 
a central theme in contemporary philosophy and a classical strand of religious literature. No matter how 
effective we are at prolonging life through medical treatment, eventually all human beings die and 
disintegrate. The temporal limitation of human life is both a bottom line and an excellent springboard in 
the dialogue between science and religion. Not only does death lie at the heart of religious experience, 
but it also raises the question of meaning and fosters a more humble approach to all human endeavors, 
both scientific and theological. As I contended in the previous chapter, anything we have, our very own 
life included, is a given or a “gift.” This experience lies at the heart of the sacramental vision. 
Furthermore, life is a mystery we cannot fully grasp. Being humble “is the realization that there is no 
intrinsic reason for one‟s being at all.”141 In other words, the experience of death and human limitation is 
a radical challenge for both religion and science. It raises the question of meaning, fosters humility, lies 
at the heart of the sacramental experience of gift-exchange, and is one of the Catholic entry points to 
environmental ethics. 
Third, human beings, like all other entities in the cosmos, are both complex interrelated unities and 
multi-leveled realities. As Peacocke argues, modern methodologically reductionist science was based on 
an intuitive, natural distinction between matter and space. This reductionist methodology was operative 
until well into the twentieth century. According to this scientific methodology, “the observable 
structures and entities of the natural world were successively, and successfully, broken down into 
smaller and smaller component units … admittedly very small bits but nevertheless essentially tiny 
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particles.”142 However, in the twentieth century, Einstein‟s theory of relativity and Planck‟s quantum 
physics blurred the lines between matter, space, time, and energy while shattering the previous 
Newtonian view of the world. Contemporary sciences have not only corrected the mechanistic metaphor 
of the modern worldview, but also fostered a more organic understanding of the cosmos as a “complex 
hierarchy of systems.”143 Furthermore, because of the spread-out character of matter, contemporary 
physics and biology affirm that “all living organisms live in intricate systems consisting of many cross-
flows and exchanges of energy and matter that constitute labyrinths of sometimes baffling 
complexity.”144 This baffling complexity and deep interconnection of all beings at the atomic level not 
only corrects flawed mechanistic understandings of nature and dualistic anthropologies, but also fosters 
a more humble approach to the ultimate mystery of nature and humans. The new emerging 
understanding of nature (and human beings) provided by contemporary science promotes the sense of 
awe and mystery that lies at the heart of religious experience, raises ultimate questions of meaning, 
acknowledges the limitation of human knowledge, and provides a common ground for dialogue between 
all sciences.
145
  
Fourth, mechanistic worldviews and dualistic separations between body and soul, res extensa and res 
cogitans, have been theoretically superseded in recent decades by both contemporary science and 
Christianity. Planck‟s quantum theory brought an end to the worldview of Newtonian physics. Charles 
Darwin proved the genetic kinship of all living beings in an evolutionary world. However, in spite of the 
deep physical and evolutionary interconnection of all entities in the cosmos, the Christian faith argues 
that the line between human and non-human beings and the line between material (visible) and spiritual 
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(invisible) dimensions of reality cannot be completely blurred.
146
 The Catholic tradition warns against 
strictly materialistic theories of human origins “and insists on the relevance of philosophy and theology 
for an adequate understanding of the „ontological leap‟ to the human which cannot be explained in 
purely scientific terms” (ITC, 64).147 We are indeed, as the ITC has affirmed, “organically linked with 
other living beings” (ITC, 71).148 Yet this connection does not imply a strictly “egalitarian” relationship 
with the natural world. A nuanced formulation of the imago Dei theme rejects the paradigm of absolute 
human “dominion” over nature which Christianity has been accused of fostering, while encouraging a 
more “ministerial” understanding of the human role in the cosmos. Hence human “lordship” not only 
encourages stewardship toward the natural world, but also grounds Christian environmental ethics in 
creation theology. In other words, human interconnection with the natural world makes room to 
understand nature as a space of deep communion where humans play a key ministerial role.  
Finally, humans are beings-in-relation. Humanity is not only “housed” in the created cosmos, but also 
spans all levels of complexity – from atomic and molecular structures to sophisticated cultural systems – 
and is a member of the larger “biotic community” or “earth system.” The openness and relational 
character of human beings, as we have seen, is underscored by both contemporary science and Christian 
theology. Human “relationality" taps deep into the sources of the biblical religions. Christian tradition 
provides “a relational – and indeed personal – conception of human beings. It is precisely the personal 
relationship with God which defines human beings and founds their relationships with other creatures” 
(ITC, 95). The natural world is “the „original gift,‟ that establishes a „space‟ of personal communion” 
                                                          
146
 So-called “deep ecologies” and pantheistic tendencies within Christian theology tend to cross this line, blurring the 
difference between the human and all other entities in the universe. Ratzinger underscores the importance of “making room” 
for the invisible. Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004). 
147
 For Karl Rahner, realities like responsibility and freedom are “transcendental realities.” They point to the transcendental 
dimension of human experience and cannot be “objectified in a subsequent scientific reflection.” Rahner, Foundations of 
Christian faith: an introduction to the idea of Christianity, 37. “Regional” or “empirical” anthropologies need the broader 
perspective offered by philosophical and theological anthropology. 
148
 Put in theological terms, “the divine communion now finds itself „housed‟ in the created cosmos” (ITC, 74). 
63 
 
(ITC, 74). A space of personal communion is best understood as a form of relational love that imitates 
the love of the three persons of the Trinity.
149
 
In summary, important anthropological themes have emerged over the last century. Human beings are 
intrinsic parts of the natural world, complex interrelated unities, radically limited and finite creatures, 
and responsible stewards of a natural world understood as a space of communion, interdependence, and 
creativity. These emerging themes do not provide a definitive, unified story of the human, but offer a 
coherent framework that takes account of the various dimensions of the human place in the cosmos. This 
framework does not, of course, solve all our current ethical and philosophical problems. But it does 
depict a more holistic view of human beings as interrelated with and dependent on the earth ecosystems. 
This nuanced understanding of the human indirectly provides ethical resources to tackle the current 
ecological problems while bridging the “narrative gap” between natural sciences, the humanities, and 
religion. As I argued at the beginning of this chapter, an understanding of the human as person-in-
community matches traditional Christian insights, corrects misinterpretations of the imago Dei theme, 
fosters the idea of indebtedness, and promotes a shared responsibility for the well-being of future 
generations and the earth ecosystems. 
In this chapter, I have tried to address the narrative character of Christian responsibility toward the 
natural world. Science does not tell stories characterized by deep human meaning; it describes the 
natural world and offers explanatory hypothesis of its inner functioning. Religions tell stories that offer 
meaning and moral guidance. In the dialogue between science and religion, important anthropological 
themes upon which a more holistic and humble story of the human can be built have emerged. These 
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themes establish a common ground for a more nuanced understanding of the human and its place in the 
cosmos. 
However, narratives are never just descriptive; they convey a direction and a purpose. The 
understanding of human beings as “responsible person-in-community” or “steward of God‟s creation” 
underscores the ministerial character of Christian responsibility while pointing toward the ethical 
direction of this eco-ministry: the promotion of the common good and the well-being of all life-forms on 
Earth. It is toward this direction that I now turn. 
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4. Christian responsibility for the common good 
 
4.1. The common good: aim and purpose of Christian responsibility 
 
The widespread and relentless ecological degradation of the earth has made two things clear: a) the 
inability of current economic and political systems to reverse the tide of destruction in many 
ecosystems; and b) the inability to preserve the common good for present and future generations. David 
Hollenbach has noted that “creative response to some of the pressing social problems emerging today 
will require a considerably stronger commitment to the common good than we now have.”150 The 
environmental crisis is one of these pressing problems. I argue in this final chapter that the relentless 
destruction of the earth‟s ecosystems is not only a major historical shift in the human-earth relation, but 
also an opportunity to revisit the ancient idea of the common good. 
An ecologically-reconstructed common good is a rich and powerful symbol that can orient human 
responsibility toward the natural world. The review of this concept expands and translates its meaning 
into modern terms and makes it available again for moral and political thought. It will not be possible, of 
course, to explore the complexity and richness of the various meanings and uses of “common good” 
within the compass of this chapter. Yet I argue that a renewed understanding of this term not only 
parallels the required expansion of other moral concepts (such as responsibility), but also offers a 
privileged vantage point in the understanding of the current crisis while grounding Christian 
environmental ethics in Catholic Social Teaching. 
The previous chapter contended that human beings are intrinsic parts of the cosmos, interrelated 
unities, finite creatures, and responsible stewards of a natural world understood as a space of 
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communion, interdependence, and creativity. This developing view of the human place in the cosmos 
parallels the emerging understanding of the earth‟s ecosystems as a global common good, a good that is 
being increasingly threatened. In the light of this perception, the present environmental crisis is not only 
an opportunity to understand human beings as responsible persons-in-relation and the natural world as a 
common good, but also a chance to urgently re-orient Christian responsibility. In order to re-direct this 
concept, I undertake two tasks. 
First, I offer an historical overview of the common good. This review shows that both secular and 
Christian understandings of this moral and political term overlook important intergenerational and 
environmental dimensions and do not suffice to address our unprecedented situation.
151
 Second, in spite 
of the difficulty of providing a definitive understanding of the common good, I argue that the earth‟s 
ecosystems are not only God‟s creation, but also the “primeval common good.” Moreover, I claim that 
human communities and the earth‟s ecosystems upon which they rely form a single “earth system” 
where the preservation of the common good becomes a moral priority. An expanded and ecologically-
reconstructed common good becomes a powerful symbol in an age of social and environmental 
breakdown. This is one of the emerging cultural stories of our time, a story that is calling for a much 
greater practice of shared responsibility. 
4.1.1. Overlooked dimensions of the common good 
 
Any human community, viable republic (res publica) or common good is grounded in and sustained 
by the earth‟s ecosystems. The earth‟s ecosystems offer water, air, soil, and all types of resources that 
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sustain the very existence of human societies; these resources are a basic dimension of the common 
good that has long been forgotten or undervalued. Any adequate review of this concept will have to 
expand upon the narrow anthropocentric perspective and include environmental and intergenerational 
dimensions in the understanding of the common good. Before continuing, however, I will pause and 
offer a brief historical overview of the concept of the common good and try to establish my first point: 
the common good has traditionally been thought of as an exclusively human-centered concept within a 
local or regional political community in a limited temporal framework. 
For Aristotle, the highest of all practical goods is human happiness. Justice produces and conserves 
this good of the political association and thus becomes central in the quest for it. Aristotle argues that 
“even if the good of the community coincides with that of the individual, it is clearly a greater and more 
perfect thing to achieve and preserve that of a community; for while it is desirable to secure what is 
good in the case of an individual, to do so in the case of a people or a state is something finer and more 
sublime.”152 The common good of the individual, then, has to be somehow subordinated to the good of 
the community. However, Aristotle does not consider non-human or future generations to be intrinsic 
parts of the good of the polis. Rather, he focuses on an exclusively human community in which 
friendship will become a necessity. Friendship, for Aristotle, is “justice in the fullest sense;”153 it is a 
form of relationship that holds the polis together. From Aristotle we learn that the preservation of the 
common good will require different degrees of friendship and just relationships. For him, “proportional 
reciprocation” is the basis of all fair exchange and is also needed to hold the human community 
together.
154
 The fact that this economic and friendship-based human exchange requires natural resources 
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and indirectly includes the relationship to future generations is something Aristotle simply did not 
consider. 
Cicero, building upon Aristotle‟s definition, understands the commonwealth as the property of an 
assemblage of people “associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the 
common good.”155 Augustine borrows Cicero‟s definition of the common good in Book II of The City of 
God and revises it in Book XIX. He first affirms that a people is “an assemblage associated by a 
common acknowledgment of right and by a community of interests.”156 Further on he will argue that “a 
people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects 
of their love.”157 The res publica belongs to the people and requires agreement on justice and law. 
Furthermore, it also requires public commitment and a shared object of love to hold the community 
together. Ancient definitions of community rely on human-centered concepts such as rationality, justice, 
partnership, and love. These descriptions did not – and probably could not – include the environment 
and a wider spatial-temporal framework into the definition of the common good. 
Along these lines, Thomas Aquinas‟ understanding of the res publica offers some points of overlap 
with that of Cicero and Augustine. The end of the law and the purpose of politics is the common good. 
Justice for Aquinas also plays a key role; it is the most important moral virtue and directs all other 
virtues to the common good.
158
 Justice seems to consist only of relations to others –human beings (Cf. 
ST II-II, q58.a2). However, Aquinas‟s distinctions between general/particular and 
distributive/commutative justice seem promising for a revised definition of the common good. These 
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distinctions make room for a broader understanding of justice in its relation to the common good of 
future generations and an expanded political community. Further on in the Summa, Aquinas argues that 
distributive justice “distributes common goods to individual persons proportionally” (ST II-II, q61.a1). 
Aquinas does not define these goods, but they certainly go well beyond exclusive human economic 
exchange; they include “natural goods” and have to do with the broader community in space and time.159 
More than six centuries after Aquinas wrote the Summa, Pope Leo XIII inaugurated a new style of 
papal writings called “social encyclicals.” These encyclicals constitute the central message of modern 
Catholic Social Teaching. Reflecting on the condition of workers on the eve of the twentieth century, 
Leo XIII argued that the institution of private ownership of the earth‟s resources should serve the 
common interest of all. In his own words, "however the earth may be apportioned among private 
owners, it does not cease to serve the common interests of all."
160
  
Seventy years after the publication of Rerum Novarum, during the Second Vatican Council, John 
XXIII reaffirmed Leo‟s commitment to the defense of the common good while defining it as the purpose 
of the public authority.
161
 Within the post-World War II climate of support of human rights, the pope 
affirms in Pacem in Terris (PT) that heads of state must create a climate in which “the individual can 
both safeguard his own rights and fulfill his duties” (PT, 63). Civil authorities must insure basic human 
rights, foster economic and social progress, and work for the common good. Furthermore, the pope goes 
so far as to affirm that the common good is “the sole reason for the existence of civil authorities” (PT, 
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54). Civil authorities “must strive to promote the common good in the interest of all, without favoring 
any individual citizen or category of citizen” (PT, 56). 
Two years before the publication of Pacem in Terris, while reflecting on the adjustment between 
wages and profits, Pope John XXIII himself had affirmed that “[the wage adjustment] must take into 
account the demands of the common good of the particular country and of the whole human family” 
(MM, 78). The common good, for the Pope, demands employment of the highest possible number, care 
for the least privileged, and the restriction of economic inequalities (Cf. MM, 79).  In introducing a 
broader understanding of the common good, the Pope acknowledged that scientific and technological 
progress will have to take into account coming generations in an increasingly globalized world (Cf. 
MM, 79). However, in spite of the progressive “expansion” of the idea of the common good, a naïve 
view of the effects of technological and scientific progress and the “intergenerational mortgage” that it 
entails pervades these papal encyclicals.  
Short after John XXIII‟s death, the Second Vatican Council‟s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in 
the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, defined the common good as “the sum of those conditions of 
social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access 
to their own fulfillment” (GS, 26).  Yet, despite the growing awareness of global interdependence and 
the existence of a unique “human family,” the Council fathers at Vatican II failed to include the 
environment in the definition of the common good.  
John Paul II is the first pope to explicitly acknowledge the gravity of the ecological crisis and its 
connection with human development. In Solicitudo Rei Socialis (SRS), the pope states “the need to 
respect the integrity and the cycles of nature and to take them into account when planning for 
development, rather than sacrificing them to certain demagogic ideas about the latter. Today this is 
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called ecological concern” (SRS, 26). This brief mention of the “ecological concern” would come to be 
further developed in Centesimus Annus. On the hundredth anniversary of Rerum Novarum, the Pope 
connects a misguided understanding of development and the problem of consumerism with what he calls 
“the ecological question.” At the heart of this question, for the Pope, “lies an anthropological error.”162 
The importance of providing a robust anthropology, then, remains a central task for Christian theology. 
John Paul II‟s awareness of the “ecological problem,” however, contrasts with his reluctance to use the 
idea of the common good more extensively. The Pope‟s critique of communism is probably the reason 
for this omission in his teachings. In summary, papal social encyclicals underscore the importance of the 
common good, show growing concern for the environment, and point toward solidarity and authentic 
human development to solve the “ecological problem.”  
From this brief excursion into the sources of our contemporary understandings of the common good, 
one point can be drawn that will permeate the remainder of this chapter: the common good has 
traditionally been interpreted as a human matter in a limited span of time and space. In contrast with the 
locally and temporarily limited framework of many ancient concepts, the idea of the common good has 
not only come to the fore of ethical debates, but is also being expanded in order to include future 
generations and non-human realities. This expansion is not only a challenge; it is a privileged 
opportunity to rethink the meaning of the common good. 
4.1.2. Challenge and opportunity 
 
The European expansion of the sixteenth century started a process now called globalization. In recent 
decades, this process, of which the environmental degradation of the planet is just one of many facets, 
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has accelerated the interaction between human societies and the ecosystems upon which they rely. This 
complex historical process and the subsequent accelerated devastation of the earth‟s ecosystems, 
paradoxically, have fostered the conscience of a “global common good.” This crisis is not only a 
daunting challenge for the future of life on earth, but an excellent opportunity to debunk false 
anthropological claims, re-discover forgotten religious insights, and understand human vocation as one 
of responsible care for the earth. This crisis is an historical opportunity to responsibly choose our 
guiding symbols. 
Roman Catholic Social Teaching is increasingly aware of the ecological dimension of the common 
good and is already making an important contribution to the ongoing debate. In recent years, the 
financial meltdowns, increasing nuclear proliferation, worldwide migrations, and global terrorist threats 
have made the international community realize that certain problems require a joint effort. Otherwise 
they will not be solved. Global warming and other related environmental problems could be included 
within this category of global “pressing issues.” Extreme weather events, depletion of fisheries, topsoil 
erosion, desertification, and high biological extinction rates are by no means restricted by national 
boundaries or cultural identities. We cannot afford strictly national or even regional approaches while 
addressing these challenges; by their very nature they are global. Solutions may well be both local and 
global. Yet a healthy environment in a just, livable world is a “global common good” that we need to 
preserve together. 
The rampant degradation of our global common good and the breakdown of many communities, then, 
becomes an opportunity to rethink the common good and our lifestyles.
163
 As Northcott argues, “it may 
be that climate change offers not only a decisive moment in the earth‟s history, but a post-industrial way 
                                                          
163
 As Michael Northcott has argued, “The potential of climate change negotiations to link nations across the world in a 
collective effort to preserve the global commons of the climate is huge.” Michael S. Northcott, A moral climate: the ethics of 
global warming (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2007), 159. 
73 
 
of conceiving of earth-human relations.”164 It “presents modern energy-dependent cultures with a 
serious limit problem. It also raises profound questions. What is life for?”165 These kinds of questions 
foster reflection and move us in our quest for a reconstructed common good. 
 
4.2. Human communities and the environment: An earth community? 
 
One of the problems we face in the midst of the current crisis, it seems, is how to define community 
adequately. This difficulty in defining precisely what is meant is shared with many terms I have been 
using in this work, such as human being, nature, or responsibility. The term community is ambiguous 
and conveys several meanings. In the effort to include non-human beings and future generations in the 
idea of the common good, one can be either too broad and therefore vague or too narrow and hence 
strictly anthropocentric. Anthropocentrism and pantheism are the two extremes I seek to avoid while 
looking for an adequate understanding of community and the common good. Many definitions of 
community have been proposed over the course of the centuries. Let us consider, for example, Robert 
Bellah‟s contemporary attempt at defining community:  
“Community is a group of people who are socially interdependent, who participate together in 
discussion and decision making, and who share certain practices that both define the community 
and are nurtured by it. Such a community is not quickly formed. It almost always has a history and 
so is also a community of memory, defined in part by its past and its memory of its past.”166  
It is obvious that Bellah, like Aristotle, Augustine, and the tradition of CST, thinks of community in 
terms of a “human community.” Only humans are rational beings, socially interdependent, and share 
common practices. The environment or natural world plays two roles in this definition. First, it sets the 
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context for the sustenance of human communities and, second, it is dependent on human decisions for its 
very stability. Plants, animals, and whole ecosystems sustain human life on earth and, conversely, they 
increasingly depend on human decisions for their very survival.
167
 Non-human beings, however, cannot 
participate as “full members” of the community. In other words, non-human beings and, to a certain 
extent, future generations have not being granted full membership in the human community. The 
question now is whether it is legitimate to extend the idea of community to non-human beings, and if so, 
in what sense and to what extent? 
In an effort to bring non-human beings and future generations into a single community while seeking 
to inspire a sense of global interdependence and shared responsibility for the well-being of all, the term 
“earth community” has been proposed by some environmental ethicists and international agencies.168 
Larry Rasmussen has argued in Earth Community, Earth Ethics that creation “is the great community” 
and nature is a “genuine community.” 169 The problem is that both Rasmussen and the Earth Charter 
neither define community nor describe the practical consequences entailed in such an understanding of 
an earth community. We could consider, as Rasmussen affirms, “nature as a subject of high moral 
standing.”170 But again, what does it mean that a non-human being is a subject? Would this road take us 
too close to Peter Singer‟s position in Animal Liberation?171 
We need to affirm that non-human beings (and future human generations) are not full members of the 
human community; they are not part of the common good as it has been proposed in the past. However, 
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they are directly and indirectly related to the well-being of present human communities and still need to 
be somehow included in the equation of the common good. Not only do we need oxygen, water, and 
food for our survival, but also particular landscapes, plants, and animals (pets) nurture our aesthetic, 
affective, and spiritual well-being. As Christians, we also believe that they reflect God‟s work in 
creation and have value in themselves. Non-human beings and future generations need to be valued, 
preserved, and taken into account appropriately. Yet how can this inclusion process be described? At 
this point in the reflection, contemporary science‟s insights are again helpful. 
Contemporary sciences depict a relational tableau of human beings while offering a framework for 
ethical reflection. The birth and rise of evolutionary biology, ecology, ethology, and weather science in 
recent decades are just a few examples of the importance of modern scientific insights in the quest for a 
reconstructed idea of the common good. As I argued in the previous chapter, ecology and ethology 
shattered the seventeenth-century “mechanical” understandings of non-human life. These emerging 
sciences show that animals and plants form complex societies. The terms population and community are 
currently being applied to non-human realities. For these new sciences, human beings and all living 
creatures are systemically connected by the energy and carbon cycles of the planet and form a single 
eco-system. The interconnection of all beings on earth and the emergent idea of a single earth system are 
good examples of these new insights that parallel the return of the concept of the common good. 
However, these new scientific understandings and the emerging idea of a single earth system are not 
mere descriptions; they convey meaning and raise questions that go well beyond scientific inquiry. As 
Northcott contends, “this idea of a common root for all human beings has tremendous moral 
implications, for it indicates that all cultures, nations and peoples share a common earth story.”172 
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Contemporary sciences show that humans are not only dependent on the earth‟s biochemical cycles 
and energy flows, but also genetically connected to all other living beings. Humans share a common 
genetic code or “family history” with all other life forms. All beings on earth rely upon each other for 
basic, common needs. The air we breathe, the water we drink, and the foods we eat render us completely 
dependent on the environment. Living beings are the nexus of a wide web or network of complex 
dependencies where competition, predation, parasitism, symbiosis, mutualism, and commensalism play 
their role.
173
 Soil, water, minerals, energy, air, and nutrients are constantly flowing and nourishing the 
complex fabric of life on earth. These flows of energy and matter are the primeval common good of the 
earth system. 
However, members of highly industrialized and urbanized societies have difficulty keeping this 
picture in mind and tend to disconnect human life from the earth‟s cycles and rhythms. Despite the rapid 
flow of information and worldwide exchange of capital and goods, contemporary societies forget their 
relation to the environment and the single earth system. We take for granted natural environmental 
patterns, like water and air circulation, and tend to think of human communities as isolated, self-
sufficient realities. Yet recent political and economic crises (such as wars or financial bankruptcies) and 
environmental disasters (such as oil spills or nuclear meltdowns) not only demonstrate that we are not 
related, but also remind us of a deeper interconnection between human communities and the earth 
system.
174
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Scientists stress the importance of complex, multilayered interactions and the need to preserve the 
“wholeness” of the ecosystem. In an effort to preserve genetic diversity, we may create gene banks or 
freeze animal sperm and eggs. However, complex ecosystems like tropical rainforests cannot be 
recreated once they have been destroyed.  Individuals and species cannot be preserved in the long run 
outside of an ecosystem. The good of the ecosystem, then, has an inevitable priority over the good of 
particular communities and individuals.
175
 
We need to promote a new, more inclusive vision of human communities, a vision where the 
common good of the community is expanded beyond local and human boundaries while affirming the 
distinctive role played by humans.
176
 Keeping in mind the positive political and social contributions of 
modernity and liberalism, we need to affirm that the doctrine of the primacy of individual rights over the 
well-being of future generations and the well-being of the earth system is dangerous and misguided. 
Both Northcott and Hollenbach have noted that there is a correlation between the rise of liberalism and 
the fall of the common good.
177
 Conversely, the current rise of an environmentally-reconstructed 
common good is throwing into question some of the liberal assumptions that undergird current political 
and economic systems.  
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 If we agree that the origin of the ecological crisis is a “modern” problem, then pre-modern insights seem to be appropriate 
to solve the problem. Both John Hart and Michael Northcott implicitly support this opinion while drawing from Native 
American, Franciscan, Amish, and Benedictine sources. According to Northcott and Hart, these different societies have 
managed to successfully articulate the personal, social, and environmental dimensions of the global common good. Yet how 
do we establish these complex connections in larger, industrial societies? How can we articulate personal goods, social 
goods, and the earth‟s global good? 
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However, although humans are totally dependent on the earth system for their survival and hence the 
common good of the earth system has a certain priority over the good of individuals, we still need to 
reaffirm that human beings are not just one more species on earth. The pantheistic, monistic, and 
misanthropic tendencies seen in many green movements have to be counter-balanced with the unique 
character of the human expressed in the Christian imago Dei theme. It is not a coincidence that, as 
Herbert McCabe points out, we are the only “linguistic animals”178 or the only ones with the power to 
preserve or bring the whole earth system to the brink of collapse. Only humans have the freedom, 
power, and responsibility to decide how to relate with the surrounding ecosystems in which they are 
embedded. 
So far I have tried to argue that human communities within the earth system, not the polis or the 
nation-state, is the new framework of a revisited common good. This is an observation regarding the 
issue of proper scaling of our ecological concerns, and the proper locus of remedial action. The problem 
I have faced is that we do not have a single human community, but rather many different human 
societies within nation states. Furthermore, we do not have a clear idea of what it means to be part of the 
earth system. Can we, then, be responsible for the fate of the earth system? A reconstructed 
understanding of the common good will thus require new ways of imagining the social, economic, 
technological, and political dimensions of human societies within the unique earth system. The 
preservation of the common good will require more than fair personal relations, just economic 
transactions, and stable political institutions. It will require scientifically-informed and sustainable 
relations and practices. Let us move on and try to explore what those practices and relations may look 
like. 
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4.3. Responsible relations and practices 
 
I suggested above that human communities are part of a wider whole or “earth system” upon which 
they rely and for whose preservation they are responsible. In the previous chapter, I argued that the 
modern illusion of individual isolation and independence is misguided and utterly false. The human-
earth relation needs to take future generations and the single earth system into account. We should be 
concerned about the risk of nuclear power plants well before the occurrence of major nuclear crises like 
the ones witnessed in Chernobyl or Fukushima. We should be concerned about the diversity of life on 
earth before half of the world‟s species disappear. We should be responsible for the well-being of future 
generations before they inherit a biologically impoverished, degraded, and polluted planet. 
There is a growing awareness that technological fixes do not suffice to tackle the increasing 
environmental problems we are facing. We certainly need to promote technological research, but we 
also must explore more sustainable human-earth relations and practices.
179
 Two elements need to be 
taken into account in order to think of any human relation and practice: time and space. We always 
occupy a particular place in a particular time; we never relate to anyone or anything on an empty stage. 
These two dimensions shape our being, our knowledge, and our imagination. We only relate to a limited 
number of people in a particular place and time. That is why we do not feel equally connected to every 
person or every non-human reality. We usually feel much closer to relatives and friends; friendship and 
family ties seem to have a stronger grip on our relations. We also feel strongly attached to particular 
places: our home, hometown, or country. The further away we move in time or space, the more difficult 
it becomes to feel related to these persons and places. The practices that flow from these relationships 
are also in accordance with the degree of closeness to the different realities with which we deal. Not 
anyone or anything matters the same. 
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At this point, Aristotle‟s reflection proves once again quite helpful. The Greek philosopher suggested 
that happiness is the highest good. Yet happiness cannot be achieved without other human beings. 
Happiness is something we discover, build, and sustain together in relationships. Friendship is the 
paradigmatic relation between humans. According to Aristotle, we not only need a group of friends for 
our well-being, but also must remain constantly open to cultivating friendly relations. However, 
Aristotle is aware that true friendship cannot be extended to everybody. True friendship is based on 
goodness and is rare “because men of this kind are few. And in addition they need time and 
intimacy.”180 However, in spite of this limitation, Aristotle argues that friendship can still be expanded 
to other persons, based on utility or pleasure.
181
 The question that remains is, could friendship be 
similarly extended to future generations and non-human beings? Can we speak of friendship to 
particular landscapes, plants, and animals? Will an expanded understanding of friendship parallel, as 
James Nash affirms, the “extension of love to the whole creation,” and, if so, will it really make any 
difference?
182
 
Contemporary sciences do not speak of friendship or love to the natural world, yet they show that 
non-human beings are sort of an “extended family,” a network of beings to which humans are 
genetically related and indebted. In our relation to God‟s creation, we need to constantly remember our 
dependence and indebtedness to God, previous generations, and the earth‟s ecosystems.183 Charles 
Taylor, while discussing the principles of distributive justice from a social perspective, notes that “for 
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this common good of living in a family, or a community, or whatever, we are all in each other‟s debt.”184 
Mutual indebtedness appears at the starting point of any human relation to the larger society and the 
natural world. We receive our genetic identity, nurture, and leisure from the earth system. We are, then, 
heavily indebted to it. In this sense, the human relation to the earth system is analogous to the relation to 
the family or the political community: it is the source and possibility of our very existence. 
But Christians affirm that it is God, not the natural world, that is the ultimate giver of life, meaning, 
and being. We read in the Acts of the Apostles that “in him we live and move and have our being” (Acts 
17:28). We believe that we are ultimately indebted to God and, through Him, to God‟s creation. For 
Christians, the relationship with God is the one that grounds our being and our well-being. The 
relationship with God is mediated by and mirrored in the natural world. Yet this relationship is not 
obvious; it requires both a contemplative attitude and some form of “ecological literacy.” It requires an 
attitude of wide-openness in our mind and spirit and senses. 
The goal of spiritual life is to attain friendship with God. At the end of the Spiritual Exercises of St. 
Ignatius of Loyola we find a prayer titled Contemplation to Attain Love.
185
 In this prayer, God‟s love is 
channeled and given freely through the natural world. God appears as the “fountain” of all creatures. As 
I argued in chapter 2, the world extracts its sacramentality from God. Created beings are good because 
of their reference to God. Nature itself is not God; nature is neither enemy nor friend. It is merely God‟s 
creation.
186
 As Michael Ivens argues, in the Contemplation to Attain Love, “as in the Foundation, the 
Creator/creature relationship is proposed with explicit reference to the things, events, and situations of 
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the exercitant‟s everyday world.”187 Created things are the “natural” mediation between God‟s love and 
human beings in their everyday lives. The world becomes a sacramental space as far as it is related to 
God and human beings are capable of perceiving His love in it.
188
 
Being aware of the connection among all beings requires both a contemplative attitude and an 
educational effort: it requires “mirroring” nature and learning from its systemic dependencies, services, 
and interconnections. As Northcott contends, “recovering the proper human relation to creation involves 
mirroring this relationship of giving without mastery, of conferral of being without control.”189 I have 
argued that this relationship of receiving and giving without mastery is the attitude and relationship 
displayed in the Eucharistic dynamic of gift exchange. Friendship, love, of the natural world foster an 
attitude of detachment, self-control, and respect toward God‟s creation. Friendship and love, and the 
sacramental vision orient the human-earth relation and inform daily human practices. 
 
4.4. Binding together 
 
Most of the human practices happen at the grassroots level. These practices shape the ethos of local 
human communities in their interactions with the earth‟s ecosystems. The sacramental vision of the 
natural world and the principles of friendship and love inform sustainable practices, take into account 
future generations, and care for non-human beings.
190
 Some of these basic, daily human practices to 
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which we should pay attention are human dwelling, mobility, and eating. These practices connect us to 
other humans and to the earth‟s ecosystems; they are ways of building (or destroying) human 
communities and the common good. Patterns of human transportation, production, and consumption are 
pushing many ecosystems to the brink of collapse.
191
 As Northcott argues, the cultural obsession with 
speed, disordered eating habits, and profligate use of energy in many parts of the world are signs of a 
“moral perversion” with dire consequences for the common good of all.192 In short, daily, local human 
practices do matter; they either build up or destroy the common good. 
Paying attention to such elements of our daily life is one of the most important ways to rebuild the 
common good and sustain the well-being of future generations and the stability of the earth‟s 
ecosystems. We will certainly need some form of global legislation to regulate, for instance, the 
emission of greenhouse gases. We will also need national and regional agreements on biodiversity 
protection, population control, industrial regulations, and agricultural subsidies.
193
 International 
institutions will be required to address the crisis of the earth‟s common good. However, these 
institutions cannot replace the important decisions made at the local level.  
Local human communities will be key in the search for a global common good for all. The immense 
power of consumer decisions and the bottom-up influence of grassroots movements on shaping the 
political and economic spheres should not be downplayed. The fair trade and Civil Rights movements in 
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the United States are just two examples of the ability of grassroots dynamics to expand and deepen the 
common good. They show that committed individuals and local communities through simple, daily 
practices can make a difference in the long run. Morally responsible persons and strong local 
communities can generate the binding energy necessary to preserve the common good. 
Daily practices and habits of eating, moving, and dwelling, then, not only bind local human 
communities together, but also profoundly shape the earth-human relation. As Robert Putman contends, 
“binding” social practices sustain the social capital of a community or nation.194 His compelling 
distinction between “bonding” and “bridging” social capital emerges as a promising insight at this point 
in my reflection. Binding practices create deep connections between both similar (bonding) and different 
(bridging) people within a society. 
Building on Putman‟s distinction, I argue that similar binding/bridging relations and practices need to 
be fostered between human communities and the earth‟s ecosystems. We need to create stronger local 
communities and bridge the gap between cities, rural communities, and the natural world. We need to 
know where and how our food is grown. We need to learn how the energy we use is produced and what 
its effects are on the wider earth system. We must know the size of our “carbon footprint.” But we also 
need to do things together. We need to escape our artificial buildings, spend time in natural 
environments, study and learn how the earth‟s ecosystems work. We need to know and experience how 
our actions and daily practices influence the natural world and the well-being of future generations. We 
need to learn how small decisions can make a big difference in preserving the common good for all. We 
cannot be responsible for the common good of the earth system unless we know its history and commit 
to its well-being. In other words, some form of social involvement and ecological literacy are required in 
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order to be responsible and bridge the gap between the modern ecologically illiterate citizen and the 
natural world.  
Over the course of the centuries, individual citizens, nation-states, and whole regions have already 
gone through similar community-binding processes. After World War II, European nations realized a 
common project had to be fostered and built together. There was no other way out of centuries of 
myopic nationalism and confrontation. In more recent times, post-industrial economies, like the former 
Detroit automobile-based industry, are reinventing themselves in order to survive and preserve the good 
of the community. The binding energy and shared responsibility required to preserve the common good 
of the earth‟s ecosystems for future generations are sustained by meaningful practices and relations 
within strong, responsible, local communities. The global media and many international corporations 
shape political decisions, economic trends, and cultural influences. Nation-states have an important role 
to play as well. Yet local and regional communities shape habits and form moral character; stable moral 
communities provide a narrative and moral context for responsible relations and practices. According to 
Northcott, medieval “parochial” towns, Amish congregations, and Benedictine monasteries are 
paradigmatic communities where the common good has flourished.
195
 In these types of communities, 
participation, material simplicity, equity, and accountability promote a shared responsibility for the 
common good. 
However, even if there are practices we can learn from these paradigmatic communities, not all of us 
will become Amish congregants or Benedictine monks. In the future, we need to become ecologically 
literate and creatively implement the principles of love and friendship. We must live closer to nature, 
limit our unbridled consumption, and be responsible for the well-being of future generations and non-
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human life. In order to build a sustainable civilization grounded in love, we need both a better 
perception of our limits and a renewed awareness of our indebtedness to God‟s creation. 
Conclusions 
 
This work did not aspire to provide detailed answers or policy recommendations for the many 
problems created by the so-called “ecological crisis.” Only a few of the issues raised by this crisis have 
been discussed. This work had a relatively modest goal: to shed some light on these complex problems 
by drawing upon aspects of the Catholic tradition and, indirectly, propose some orientations than can 
help solve them. I conclude this work by summarizing some of the insights this research has offered. I 
will rely on a few brief, synthetic statements that may help recapitulate the argument of this thesis: 
 
 In an age of widespread ecological breakdown, responsibility becomes a central Christian ethical 
concept and an appropriate term to express the complexity of the human-earth relation. The 
concept of responsibility is a multidimensional one; its meaning overlaps with many other 
philosophical and theological concepts such as vocation, fear, love, sin, knowledge, freedom, 
narrative, and community. 
 From the circular relationship between Christian ethics and sacramental liturgy flows an ethics of 
responsibility toward creation. It is an ethics that requires a double dynamic of attachment to and 
detachment from creation. This type of dynamic is displayed in the Eucharist and can be stated 
as a dynamic of “wide-open senses” and “gift-return.” 
 An “ecologically-literate deacon” or “steward of creation” are good anthropological metaphors 
to foster responsibility toward creation. 
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 The dialogue between science and religion is providing a set of anthropological themes upon 
which these metaphors and a sound understanding of responsibility can be built. These include, 
to mention just a few, that human beings are intrinsic parts of the natural world, complex 
interrelated unities, radically limited and finite creatures, and responsible stewards of a natural 
world understood as a space of communion, interdependence, and creativity.   
 This image of dependent persons-in-community matches traditional Christian insights, corrects 
misinterpretations of the imago Dei theme, fosters the idea of indebtedness to God‟s creation, 
and promotes a shared responsibility for the well-being of future generations and our global earth 
system. It indirectly provides ethical resources to tackle the current ecological problems while 
bridging the “narrative gap” between natural sciences, the humanities, and religion. 
 This developing view of the human place in the cosmos as dependent persons-in-community 
parallels the emerging understanding of the earth‟s ecosystems as a global common good. The 
whole earth system is not only God‟s creation, but also the “primeval common good.” 
 An ecologically-reconstructed common good able to take into account future generations, and 
non-human beings is a rich and powerful symbol that orients human responsibility toward the 
natural world in an age of ecological breakdown. 
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